Introduction
The term "criminal force" is central to the law of non-fatal offences against the person in England and Wales. It forms the cornerstone of the actus reus for the offence of battery, which is a form of common assault charged under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Battery is defined at common law as the unlawful application of force to the body of another person. While the term "force" might suggest a requirement for violence or injury, the legal interpretation is significantly broader. This essay will explain the legal meaning of "criminal force", demonstrating how the courts have interpreted it to include minimal contact. It will argue that while the definition is wide, its scope is practically limited by the doctrine of implied consent to the physical contact that is part of everyday life.
The Minimal Threshold for Force
The law does not require the application of force to be violent, aggressive, or cause any pain or injury. The slightest physical contact is sufficient to constitute force for the purposes of battery. The classic authority is the case of Cole v Turner (1704), where it was held that ‘the least touching of another in anger is a battery’. This principle has been consistently upheld in modern law. For example, in R v Thomas (1985), the Court of Appeal held that touching the bottom of a woman’s skirt was equivalent to touching the woman herself, and therefore constituted a battery. This illustrates that the force does not even have to be skin-on-skin contact; it can be applied through clothing.
The leading modern case on this topic is Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172. In this case, a police officer took hold of a woman's arm to prevent her from walking away. The officer was not exercising her power of arrest. Lord Goff, giving the judgment, affirmed that the fundamental principle is that every person's body is inviolate. He stated that any physical touching, regardless of how trivial, could technically amount to a battery. This broad interpretation also includes indirect applications of force. For instance, in DPP v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067, a schoolboy who put acid in a hot air hand-dryer was found to have committed a battery against the next user, even though he did not directly apply the force himself. Similarly, in Haystead v DPP [2000] 2 Cr App R 339, a man who punched a woman causing her to drop the baby she was holding was held to have committed a battery against the baby. These cases show that the method of applying force is not as important as the fact that force was unlawfully applied to the victim.
The Requirement of Unlawfulness
For "force" to be "criminal", it must be unlawful. The most significant element that prevents the law on battery from being absurdly wide is the concept of consent. Lord Goff in Collins v Wilcock explained that there is an implied consent to the ‘exigencies of everyday life’. This covers physical contact that is an unavoidable part of normal social interaction, such as being jostled in a busy street, brushing against someone on public transport, or touching someone to get their attention. Such contact is considered a normal part of life and is therefore lawful. The application of force becomes unlawful when it goes beyond what is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life.
The question of whether the touching must be ‘hostile’ to be unlawful has caused some confusion. The reference to touching ‘in anger’ in Cole v Turner suggests a requirement of hostility. However, Lord Goff in Collins v Wilcock preferred to categorise contact as unlawful if it was not consented to and was not part of the ordinary exigencies of life, rather than focusing on hostility. He considered the police officer's grasp of the woman's arm to be unlawful not because it was hostile, but because it went beyond the scope of her duty and was not a generally acceptable form of conduct. Therefore, the primary test is not whether the defendant acted with hostility, but whether the physical contact was unlawful.
Conclusion
In summary, the concept of "criminal force" in the law of battery is defined very broadly. It includes any intentional or reckless physical contact with another person, direct or indirect, without their consent. The degree of force used is irrelevant; the slightest touch can suffice. This expansive definition, which could criminalise a vast range of social interactions, is made practical and reasonable by the common law’s recognition of implied consent. As established in Collins v Wilcock, the unavoidable and generally acceptable physical contacts of everyday life are considered lawful. It is this exception that provides the crucial dividing line between lawful social interaction and the criminal act of battery.
References
- Card, R. (2006) Card, Cross and Jones: Criminal Law. 17th edn. LexisNexis.
- Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149.
- Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172.
- Criminal Justice Act 1988.
- DPP v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067.
- Haystead v DPP [2000] 2 Cr App R 339.
- R v Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App R 331.
