Introduction
This submission outlines the prosecution case against Thomas Dudley and Edwin Stephens for the murder of Richard Parker. The facts are not in substantial dispute: adrift at sea and facing starvation, the defendants killed the cabin boy, Richard Parker, and consumed his flesh and blood to survive. While the circumstances are undeniably tragic, they do not provide a legal justification for the defendants’ actions. The prosecution’s position is clear: the defendants unlawfully killed another human being with the intention to kill, satisfying the elements of murder. The anticipated defence of necessity is not, and should not be, available as a defence to a charge of murder in English law.
The Elements of Murder are Satisfied
The crime of murder consists of an *actus reus* (unlawful killing of a person) and *mens rea* (intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm). Both elements are clearly present on the facts of this case.
The *actus reus* is the unlawful killing of Richard Parker. The evidence will show that Dudley, with the assent of Stephens, pushed a knife into Parker’s throat, causing him to die. This was a positive, voluntary act that directly caused the death of the victim. The killing was unlawful as it was not done in self-defence or under any other recognised legal justification.
The *mens rea* for murder is also established. By stabbing the victim in the throat, the defendants demonstrated an undeniable intention to kill. There can be no other interpretation of such a lethal act. The defendants’ motive – to survive – is legally distinct from their intention, which was to end Parker’s life (Herring, 2020). Therefore, on a straightforward application of the law, the defendants are guilty of murder.
The Inapplicability of the Defence of Necessity
It is anticipated that the defence will argue that the defendants’ actions were justified by the doctrine of necessity; that they were compelled to kill Parker to avoid their own certain deaths from starvation. The prosecution submits that this defence must fail for several fundamental reasons.
First, there is no general defence of necessity in English law that permits the taking of an innocent life. The authorities are clear that the preservation of one’s own life does not give one the right to take another’s. The jurist Sir Matthew Hale stated that a man starving is not permitted to steal food, let alone kill an innocent person to eat them (Hale, 1736). This principle reflects a core value of the law: the absolute sanctity of human life.
Second, to allow a defence of necessity in these circumstances would be to create a legal rule that is “based on no legal principle and is dangerous” (*R v Dudley and Stephens* (1884) 14 QBD 273, p. 287). Who is to be the judge of such a necessity? How can the “value” of one life be measured against another? In this case, the defendants chose to kill Richard Parker because he was the weakest and an orphan, and therefore the least likely to be missed. To permit this would be to allow the strong to sacrifice the weak to save themselves, a principle utterly incompatible with law and morality. From a criminological perspective, the law’s function is to protect the vulnerable, not to provide a legal excuse for their victimisation in extreme situations.
Third, this case must be distinguished from the defence of self-defence. Self-defence is available where a person uses reasonable force to repel an unjust aggressor. Richard Parker was not an aggressor; he was an innocent boy, sleeping and helpless at the time he was killed. The defendants were not defending themselves from him, but rather sacrificing him for their own benefit.
Conclusion
The defendants, Dudley and Stephens, intentionally killed an innocent and unoffending boy. The elements of the crime of murder are plainly established. The extreme temptation they faced cannot be accepted as a legal excuse. As Lord Coleridge CJ reasoned in the judgment of this very case, the law has a duty to set standards of behaviour, even if they are difficult to meet in extreme circumstances (*R v Dudley and Stephens*, p. 288). Allowing a defence of necessity here would lead to a state of lawlessness where the most vulnerable are at the mercy of the strongest. For these reasons, the prosecution submits that the defendants should be found guilty of murder.
References
- Hale, M. (1736) The History of the Pleas of the Crown. Vol. 1. E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling.
- Herring, J. (2020) Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 9th edn. Oxford University Press.
- R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 DC.
