# Australia should become a republic
## Introduction
Australia’s system of government, a constitutional monarchy, places the British monarch as its head of state, a role exercised by a Governor-General appointed on the advice of the Australian Prime Minister. This arrangement has been a feature of Australian political life since Federation in 1901. However, the debate over whether Australia should sever its final constitutional ties with the British monarchy and become a republic has been a recurring theme in the nation’s political discourse. The most significant moment in this debate was the 1999 referendum, which saw the Australian people vote against a proposal to become a republic. This essay will argue that while the case for an Australian republic is strong on the grounds of national sovereignty and identity, the practical challenges of agreeing on a new model and the high constitutional bar for change mean that the status quo is likely to persist. The debate is less about *if* Australia should become a republic and more about *how*, and the lack of consensus on this latter question remains the most significant barrier to reform.
## The Argument for National Identity
The primary argument advanced by proponents of a republic is centred on the idea of national identity and maturity. For many, it seems anachronistic that a modern, independent, and multicultural nation like Australia should have a head of state who is a hereditary monarch of another country (Australian Republic Movement, n.d.). Proponents argue that the Australian head of state should be an Australian citizen, chosen by Australians, and representative of Australia alone. This symbolic change, it is argued, would represent the final step in Australia’s long journey from a British colony to a fully independent nation. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating, a vocal republican, famously argued that the connection to the British monarchy was a legacy of a different era and did not reflect contemporary Australian society or its place in the world, particularly within the Asia-Pacific region (Keating, 1992).
This argument is not merely about symbolism; it concerns how Australia projects itself to the world. Having a foreign head of state can, for some, create an impression of subservience or a nation not yet fully confident in its own identity. Malcolm Turnbull, who led the republican campaign in 1999, has consistently argued that the office of head of state should be one to which any Australian child can aspire, which is impossible under the current hereditary system (Turnbull, 2019). Therefore, the case for a republic is often framed as a necessary step to align Australia’s constitutional arrangements with its social and political reality as a sovereign nation.
## The Case for the Status Quo: Stability and Tradition
In contrast, those who support the continuation of the constitutional monarchy, often known as monarchists, argue that the current system provides stability, continuity, and a safeguard against political overreach. The core of this position is often summarised by the phrase, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” (Jones, 2013). Monarchists contend that the system has served Australia well for over a century, providing a framework for stable democratic government. The Governor-General, as the monarch’s representative, is seen as being above party politics, providing a politically neutral head of state who can act as a unifying figure and a constitutional umpire.
A key element of this argument is the role of the Governor-General’s ‘reserve powers’. These are powers that can be exercised without, or contrary to, ministerial advice in exceptional circumstances, most famously demonstrated by the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975 (Twomey, 2006). For monarchists, these powers represent a crucial, if rarely used, check on executive power, ensuring that a government cannot act unconstitutionally. They argue that replacing the Governor-General with a president could either politicise the role (if directly elected) or weaken its authority to act as a constitutional guardian. Furthermore, groups like Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (n.d.) argue that the current system is both effective and inexpensive, providing the benefits of a head of state without the political divisions that an election for a president might create.
## The Republican Dilemma: The Model
Perhaps the greatest single obstacle to Australia becoming a republic is the lack of consensus on what model should replace the current system. This division was a key factor in the failure of the 1999 referendum and continues to fracture the republican movement. The two principal models debated are direct election and parliamentary appointment.
The **direct election model** proposes that the Australian people would directly vote for their president. This is seen by its supporters as the most democratic option, giving the people a direct say in who their head of state is. However, opponents of this model, including many who support a republic, fear that a directly elected president with their own popular mandate could create a rival power centre to the Prime Minister. This could lead to constitutional gridlock and political instability, fundamentally changing Australia’s system of parliamentary government (Williams, 2008).
The **parliamentary appointment model**, which was the model proposed in the 1999 referendum, suggests the president would be appointed by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament. Supporters of this model argue that it would ensure the head of state is a respected, unifying figure who has broad political support, thus preserving the largely ceremonial and apolitical nature of the role. However, this model was criticised during the 1999 campaign as a “politician’s republic,” with opponents arguing that it would simply transfer power from a foreign monarch to Australian politicians, rather than to the Australian people (Warhurst, 1999). The failure of the 1999 referendum was partly due to this division, with many direct-election republicans voting ‘no’ alongside monarchists, as they preferred the existing system to the proposed alternative.
## The Constitutional Hurdle
The final, and highly significant, barrier to change is the constitutional process itself. Section 128 of the Australian Constitution sets a very high bar for any amendment. To be successful, a referendum must achieve a ‘double majority’: a majority of voters nationwide, and a majority of voters in a majority of states (at least four out of six). Since 1901, only 8 of 44 proposals to amend the Constitution have been successful (Parliamentary Education Office, n.d.). This mechanism was designed to ensure that the Constitution is not changed lightly and requires a broad consensus across the country. For a republic to be established, not only would republicans need to agree on a single, popular model, but they would also need to convince a double majority of Australians to support it. Given the deep divisions on the model and the inherent caution of the Australian electorate towards constitutional change, this remains a formidable challenge.
## Conclusion
In conclusion, the proposition that Australia should become a republic is a compelling one, rooted in powerful ideas of national identity, sovereignty, and the desire for a head of state who is unambiguously Australian. The current system, with a British monarch as the head of a modern, independent Australia, appears to many to be an anachronism. However, the arguments for retaining the status quo, based on its proven record of providing political stability and a neutral constitutional guardian, cannot be easily dismissed. The central problem for the republican cause is not a lack of popular sentiment, but a lack of agreement on the alternative. The division between the direct election and parliamentary appointment models has created a political impasse that was instrumental in the 1999 referendum’s failure. Until republicans can unite behind a single, coherent, and popular model that can overcome the significant constitutional hurdle of a double majority, it seems likely that Australia will, for the foreseeable future, remain a constitutional monarchy.
## References
- Australians for Constitutional Monarchy. (n.d.) Why the Monarchy?. Available at: [I am unable to verify a stable URL for this source, but the organisation’s arguments are widely documented].
- Australian Republic Movement. (n.d.) Our Vision. Available at: [I am unable to verify a stable URL for this source, but the organisation’s arguments are widely documented].
- Jones, D. (2013) ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, The Spectator Australia, 23 November.
- Keating, P. J. (1992) An Australian Republic: The Way Forward. Speech to Parliament, 7 June.
- Parliamentary Education Office. (n.d.) Referendums and Plebiscites. PEO.
- Turnbull, M. (2019) A Bigger Picture. Hardie Grant Publishing.
- Twomey, A. (2006) The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors. The Federation Press.
- Warhurst, J. (1999) ‘The Low Vote for the Republic in the 1999 Referendum: The Role of the Australian Republican Movement’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 34(3), pp. 411-417.
- Williams, G. (2008) ‘Why Australia’s Republic Debate is a Mess and How to Fix It’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 31(1), pp. 317-333.
