# The Constitutional Development of Ceylon: Explaining the Donoughmore and Soulbury Constitutions
This essay will explain the main features of the Donoughmore Constitution and the Soulbury Constitution, which were two pivotal stages in the constitutional evolution of Ceylon, now known as Sri Lanka, during the final decades of British colonial rule. These constitutional frameworks represented different approaches to governance and the preparation for self-rule. The Donoughmore Constitution introduced a unique experimental model, whereas the Soulbury Constitution marked a return to the more familiar Westminster system, ultimately paving the way for Ceylon’s independence in 1948. Understanding their principal characteristics is essential to appreciating the political foundations and subsequent challenges of the modern Sri Lankan state.
## The Donoughmore Constitution (1931-1947)
The Donoughmore Constitution was a significant and radical departure from previous colonial constitutional models. It was the outcome of the Special Commission on the Constitution of Ceylon, chaired by the Earl of Donoughmore, which visited the island in 1927-28. The commission was tasked with addressing the shortcomings of the existing legislative council, which was seen as inadequate for managing the country’s affairs and accommodating local political aspirations (de Silva, 1981). The resulting constitution, implemented in 1931, had several distinctive features that set it apart from typical colonial structures.
Perhaps the most radical feature of the Donoughmore Constitution was the introduction of universal adult suffrage. At a time when the franchise was limited by property and literacy qualifications in Britain itself and across its empire, the decision to grant the vote to all men and women over the age of 21 was a remarkable step. The Donoughmore Commissioners believed that broadening the electorate was necessary to make legislators accountable to the general population rather than to narrow communal or class interests (Donoughmore Report, 1928). This measure fundamentally transformed the political landscape of Ceylon by empowering the mass populace for the first time.
Another central feature was the creation of a State Council. This body was unique in that it combined both legislative and executive functions. Instead of a separate cabinet and parliament, the State Council acted as both. Following an election, the 50 elected members of the State Council were divided into seven Executive Committees, with each committee taking responsibility for a set of government departments, such as Home Affairs, Agriculture, or Education. This structure was designed to be a form of power-sharing and a training ground for Ceylonese politicians in the practicalities of administration (Wilson, 1979).
Flowing from this was the constitution’s most famous innovation: the Executive Committee system. Each of the seven committees elected a Chairman from among its members, who then became the Minister for that particular area. These seven Ceylonese ministers, along with three British Officers of State (the Chief Secretary, the Legal Secretary, and the Financial Secretary), formed the Board of Ministers. The Board was intended to function as a coordinating body, but it was not a cabinet in the Westminster sense. It lacked collective responsibility, as each minister was primarily accountable to their own Executive Committee, not to the Board or the State Council as a whole (Jennings, 1948). The presence of the three unelected British officers, who controlled the key areas of defence, finance, and justice, ensured that ultimate control remained in British hands. This system was criticised for being slow and for creating a government of competing individuals rather than a cohesive policy-making body (Russell, 1992).
## The Soulbury Constitution (1947-1972)
By the 1940s, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the Donoughmore system, and Ceylonese leaders were demanding full self-government. In response, the British government appointed a new commission in 1944, led by Lord Soulbury, to devise a new constitution. The Soulbury Constitution, which came into effect in 1947, granted Ceylon full Dominion status within the British Commonwealth, which was formalised with independence on 4 February 1948. In contrast to the Donoughmore experiment, the Soulbury Constitution was modelled closely on the British Westminster system.
The primary feature of the Soulbury Constitution was the establishment of a parliamentary system of cabinet government. It replaced the unique State Council and Executive Committee system with a bicameral legislature, consisting of an elected House of Representatives and an appointed Senate. Executive power was vested in a Prime Minister and a cabinet of ministers who were drawn from, and collectively responsible to, Parliament (Soulbury Report, 1945). This restored the principle of collective responsibility that had been absent under the Donoughmore framework and created a clear separation between the legislature and the executive, in line with British constitutional conventions. The Head of State was the British monarch, represented in Ceylon by a Governor-General who, by convention, acted on the advice of the Ceylonese Prime Minister.
A second key feature was the detailed provision for the protection of minority rights, which the Soulbury Commissioners recognised as a critical issue in a plural society. The most important of these provisions was Section 29(2) of the constitution. This section explicitly prohibited Parliament from enacting any law that would impose disabilities or confer advantages on people of any one community or religion that were not imposed or conferred on people of other communities or religions (Coe, 2004). This clause was intended to be a fundamental safeguard for ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Tamils and Muslims, against discriminatory legislation by the Sinhalese majority. However, the effectiveness of this safeguard proved limited. The passing of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956, which made Sinhala the sole official language, was seen by many as a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 29(2), and subsequent judicial appeals to the Privy Council did not ultimately prevent such majoritarian policies (Wilson, 1979).
The structure of representation was also a significant feature. The Soulbury Constitution provided for a 101-member House of Representatives. Seats were allocated based on a formula that considered both territory and population, which was a system designed to give some weight to sparsely populated provinces, many of which had high concentrations of minority communities (de Silva, 1981). Furthermore, the Governor-General had the power to appoint up to six members to the House of Representatives to represent any interests that were felt to be inadequately represented through the electoral process. These measures were also part of the attempt to create a balanced and fair system of governance for all communities.
## Conclusion
In conclusion, the Donoughmore and Soulbury constitutions represent two distinct phases in Sri Lanka’s journey towards independence, each with its own defining features. The Donoughmore Constitution was an audacious experiment in governance, characterised by universal suffrage and the unique Executive Committee system, which aimed to train local leaders while retaining British oversight. However, its lack of collective responsibility and failure to resolve communal tensions led to its replacement. The Soulbury Constitution marked a return to the orthodox Westminster model, establishing a system of parliamentary cabinet government. It provided the framework for Ceylon’s independence and included specific, though ultimately inadequate, safeguards for minorities through mechanisms like Section 29(2). While the Donoughmore system was an educational but inefficient experiment, the Soulbury model provided a functioning parliamentary democracy at the point of independence, yet its inability to protect minorities from majoritarian legislation foreshadowed many of the political conflicts that would later engulf the nation.
## References
- Coe, P. (2004) ‘The new courts of Sri Lanka: the politics of justice’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 27(1), pp. 87–104.
- de Silva, K. M. (1981) A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Jennings, I. (1948) The Constitution of Ceylon. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution of Ceylon (1928) Cmd. 3131. London: HMSO.
- Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform (1945) Cmd. 6677. London: HMSO.
- Russell, J. (1992) Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931-1947. Dehiwala: Tisara Prakasakayo.
- Wilson, A. J. (1979) Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979. London: Macmillan.
