# Critically evaluate whether there should be a Good Samaritan law in England and Wales
## Introduction
The law of England and Wales does not impose a general duty on individuals to intervene and assist others in peril. This position, often summarised by the phrase “there is no duty to rescue”, stands in contrast to the laws of many other jurisdictions and raises significant moral questions. A “Good Samaritan” law could change this, either by creating a legal duty to provide reasonable assistance to a person in imminent danger or by protecting those who voluntarily intervene from liability. This essay will evaluate the arguments for and against the introduction of such a law. It will argue that while the moral case for encouraging rescue is strong, the practical and philosophical objections to compelling it mean that the current legal position, while imperfect, is preferable to a mandatory duty to rescue.
## The Current Legal Position on Omissions
In English tort law, liability is generally imposed for positive acts, not for failures to act, or omissions. The classic statement of this principle was provided by Lord Hoffmann in *Stovin v Wise* [1996] AC 923, who described it as a “moral question” but one that the law should not enforce due to its intrusion on individual liberty. The law does not require a person to act as a “Good Samaritan” simply because they are a bystander to a dangerous situation. For example, an individual who watches another drown, without offering a lifebuoy that is close at hand, commits no tort.
However, this is not an absolute rule. The courts have recognised exceptions where a duty to act positively does exist. These exceptions typically arise from a special relationship between the claimant and defendant, such as that of an employer and employee, or where the defendant has assumed responsibility for the claimant’s welfare (*Barrett v Ministry of Defence* [1995] 1 WLR 1217). A duty can also arise where the defendant has created the source of danger, even if unintentionally. Despite these exceptions, the default position remains that there is no general liability for a failure to rescue a stranger.
## Arguments for a Good Samaritan Law
The primary argument for introducing a duty to rescue is a moral one. Proponents argue that a legal duty would reflect and promote a sense of civic responsibility and social cohesion (Ashworth, 1993). In a society that values community, it seems morally indefensible that the law would not require a minimal act of assistance, such as making a telephone call to the emergency services, where this carries no risk to the rescuer. Many European countries, such as France and Germany, have “duty to rescue” statutes, which suggests that such laws are workable and can be integrated into a modern legal system.
Furthermore, a Good Samaritan law could serve to protect rescuers. A significant fear for potential helpers, particularly those with professional skills like doctors, is that they might be sued for negligence if their intervention is not successful or makes things worse. While the standard of care is adjusted for emergencies, the fear of litigation remains. A well-drafted statute could provide immunity from liability for volunteer rescuers, except in cases of gross negligence, thereby encouraging more people to help. The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 was intended to have this effect, but it has been widely criticised as being a symbolic piece of legislation with little practical impact on judicial decision-making.
## Arguments Against a Good Samaritan Law
The principal objection to a mandatory duty to rescue is founded on the principle of individual autonomy and liberty. Forcing an individual to act, under threat of legal sanction, is a significant infringement of personal freedom. As Lord Hoffmann noted in *Stovin*, it is “less of an invasion of an individual’s freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions than to impose upon him a duty to rescue”.
There are also considerable practical difficulties. A statutory duty would create uncertainty. For instance, how would the law define the point at which a duty to act arises? What level of risk to the rescuer would be considered acceptable? These questions would likely lead to an increase in litigation as courts tried to establish the boundaries of the duty. There is also the risk of encouraging ill-judged interventions from people who feel compelled to act but lack the skills to do so effectively, potentially causing more harm than good. The “why me?” problem is also a factor; in a situation with multiple bystanders, it would be difficult to determine who was legally responsible for failing to act.
## Conclusion
In conclusion, the debate over a Good Samaritan law involves a direct conflict between moral expectations and the legal principles of individual liberty. The arguments for encouraging intervention, founded on morality and social solidarity, are compelling. However, the legal and practical obstacles to creating a general duty to rescue are significant. The difficulty in defining the scope of such a duty, combined with the profound infringement on personal autonomy it would represent, suggests that the common law’s cautious approach is justified. While the law could perhaps offer stronger statutory protections for those who do choose to intervene, imposing a general, legally enforceable duty to rescue would be a step too far. The current framework of specific, pre-existing relationships creating a duty of care provides a more certain and principled basis for liability for omissions.
## References
- Ashworth, A. (1993) ‘The scope of criminal liability for omissions’, Law Quarterly Review, 109, pp. 424-459.
- Barrett v Ministry of Defence [1995] 1 WLR 1217.
- Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015.
- Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923.
