The toppling of Edward Colston’s statue raises the question of whether moral beliefs can justify actions that amount to criminal damage. The acquittal of the four protesters does not create a legal precedent, but it does show a potential conflict between strict legal rules and a jury’s view of justice. This essay will argue that while moral objections cannot legally justify criminal damage, the Colston case shows that the legal system is not completely separate from moral considerations. The law must maintain clear rules to protect order, but the jury’s role can sometimes reflect wider public values, creating a tension that the law struggles to resolve.
The starting point is the criminal law itself. The offence is set out in section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which criminalises destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse. The available ‘lawful excuse’ defences under section 5 of the Act are narrow. They generally apply where a person believes the owner would have consented, or where the action was necessary to protect other property (Cresswell and others, 2022). These defences do not accommodate actions motivated by a moral objection to the property itself. From a purely legal perspective, the protesters’ belief that the statue represented an offensive history did not provide them with a lawful excuse for damaging it. The law, therefore, offers little room for individual conscience to override property rights.
However, the jury’s decision to acquit the ‘Colston Four’ suggests that the legal process is not entirely insulated from morality. The jury may have exercised its power to return a verdict based on its conscience, a practice sometimes referred to as jury equity. This does not change the law, but it shows that a group of citizens may see a prosecution as unjust in a specific context. This connects to the debate between law and morality. Legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart argue that the question of what the law is must be kept separate from the question of what it ought to be (Hart, 1994). According to this view, the law against criminal damage is valid regardless of whether we think the Colston statue should have been protected. The jury’s verdict might be seen as dangerously blurring this line, allowing a moral judgment to override a clear legal rule.
The risk of blurring this line is that it could undermine the rule of law. If any individual or group could damage property because they found it morally offensive, the law would become subjective and uncertain. It would depend on whose moral view was strongest, rather than on a set of rules that apply equally to everyone. This would create inconsistency and could lead to disorder, as different groups might feel justified in removing symbols they disagree with. The rule of law requires predictability and that disputes are resolved through established processes, not by direct action. Allowing moral protest to be a defence to criminal damage would challenge this principle by prioritising individual belief over legal order.
The Court of Appeal confirmed the orthodox legal position in Attorney General’s Reference on a Point of Law No 1 of 2022. This case arose directly from the Colston trial. The Court clarified that the human rights of freedom of expression (Article 10) and assembly (Article 11) could not be used as a defence in cases involving significant damage during a protest ([2022] EWCA Crim 1259, at [98]). The Court emphasised that such matters should be addressed through democratic channels. This judgment reinforces the separation between law and moral protest. It confirms that while protest is protected, it does not extend to causing significant damage to property, regardless of the motive.
In conclusion, moral objections to public symbols cannot provide a legal justification for criminal damage under English law. The Criminal Damage Act 1971 is clear, and the Court of Appeal has affirmed that human rights protections do not excuse such acts. The acquittal in the Colston case should be understood not as a change in the law, but as an instance of a jury reaching a verdict that it considered just on the facts. While this highlights a tension between law and public morality, allowing moral belief to be a general defence would create uncertainty and risk undermining the rule of law. The law’s function is to provide a stable framework, and resolving disputes over controversial symbols must therefore occur through political and legal processes, not through unlawful action.
References
Attorney General’s Reference on a Point of Law No 1 of 2022 [2022] EWCA Crim 1259.
Cresswell, J., Wilson, O., Scothern, J. and Graham, S. (2022) Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2023. Oxford University Press.
Criminal Damage Act 1971.
Hart, H.L.A. (1994) The Concept of Law. 2nd edn. Oxford University Press.
