# “Although one way communication is often necessary its effectiveness is often limited” (Berko, Wolvin and Wolvin, 1998, p.11) Discuss.
## Introduction
Communication is fundamental to the operation of any legal system. The quote from Berko, Wolvin and Wolvin (1998) identifies a core tension in communication: the conflict between the necessity of one-way directives and their inherent limitations. In the context of the law of England and Wales, one-way communication is not merely a common occurrence but a structural necessity. It underpins the authority of the state, providing commands from the legislature and binding decisions from the judiciary. However, as the quote suggests, the effectiveness of these communications is frequently constrained. This essay will argue that while the English legal system is built upon necessary forms of one-way communication, such as legislation and judicial precedent, its effectiveness is indeed limited by the unavoidable problems of ambiguity and interpretation. The very existence of complex legal doctrines, such as the rules of statutory interpretation and the principles for discerning the *ratio decidendi* of a case, serves as evidence of the law’s attempt to manage these inherent limitations.
## The Necessity of One-Way Communication in Law
The legal system relies heavily on one-way communication to establish authority, certainty, and finality. Two primary examples illustrate this necessity: Acts of Parliament and judicial judgments.
Firstly, legislation is perhaps the most obvious form of one-way legal communication. An Act of Parliament represents a command from the sovereign legislature to the judiciary, government bodies, and the public. There is no immediate dialogue or feedback mechanism within the text of the statute itself. This one-way model is essential for a functioning state governed by the rule of law. It ensures that laws are created and promulgated with authority, applying uniformly across the jurisdiction. As stated by Dicey, a key tenet of the rule of law is that no person is punishable except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner (Dicey, 1915). This requires the law to be laid down in a clear, accessible, and authoritative form, which the one-way communication of a statute is designed to achieve. It would be impractical and chaotic for Parliament to engage in a continuous dialogue with millions of citizens about the content of every law. Therefore, the one-way nature of legislation is a necessary feature for providing a stable and certain legal framework.
Secondly, judicial judgments are another crucial form of one-way communication. When a court delivers a judgment, it provides a final and binding resolution to a dispute between parties. This delivers finality, a core objective of the litigation process. The judgment is a directive which the parties must obey, and it is not open to immediate negotiation. Furthermore, under the doctrine of *stare decisis* (the principle of binding precedent), a judgment from a senior court communicates the law to lower courts, which are bound to follow the ruling in future similar cases. This hierarchical, one-way flow of information is fundamental to ensuring consistency and predictability within the common law system. Without the authoritative, one-way nature of precedent, the law would lack coherence, and similar cases could be decided differently, undermining justice and fairness. Thus, for both legislative supremacy and judicial consistency, one-way communication is an indispensable tool.
## The Limited Effectiveness of Legislation
Despite its necessity, the effectiveness of legislation as a form of one-way communication is often limited by ambiguity in the written word. Parliament attempts to draft statutes with precision, but language is an imperfect medium. Words can have multiple meanings, and drafters cannot foresee every possible scenario to which the law might apply. This limitation gives rise to the entire field of statutory interpretation, where the judiciary is tasked with ascertaining the meaning of Parliament’s words. The existence of the various rules of interpretation is a clear acknowledgement that the one-way message sent by Parliament is not always received with perfect clarity.
The literal rule, for instance, requires judges to give words their plain, ordinary, and grammatical meaning, even if this leads to an absurd result. In *Whiteley v Chappell* (1868), the defendant was acquitted of impersonating “any person entitled to vote” because he impersonated a dead person, who was literally not entitled to vote. This case illustrates how a strict adherence to the one-way communication can undermine its intended purpose, limiting its effectiveness.
To counter such limitations, courts have developed other approaches. The golden rule allows judges to depart from the literal meaning to avoid an absurd outcome. In *R v Allen* (1872), the court had to interpret the word ‘marry’ in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in the context of bigamy. A literal interpretation would mean the offence was impossible to commit, as a person already married cannot legally marry another. The court therefore interpreted ‘marry’ as meaning to ‘go through a ceremony of marriage’, thus avoiding absurdity and giving effect to Parliament’s intention. Similarly, the mischief rule, established in *Heydon’s Case* (1584), allows the court to look at the ‘mischief’ or problem the Act was intended to remedy. In *Smith v Hughes* (1960), prostitutes soliciting from a balcony were found to be “in a street” for the purposes of the Street Offences Act 1959, as the Act was designed to clean up the streets, and their actions were aimed at people in the street. These interpretive rules demonstrate that the one-way statutory command is often incomplete and requires a secondary, interpretive process by the judiciary to become fully effective.
## The Limited Effectiveness of Judicial Precedent
The effectiveness of judicial precedent as a one-way communication is similarly limited. While a judgment provides a binding decision, its value as a precedent for future cases depends on the ability of future judges to extract the core legal principle, or *ratio decidendi*. This is often a difficult task, as the *ratio* may be entwined with *obiter dicta* (other things said by the judge) and the specific facts of the case. A lengthy judgment with multiple concurring opinions can make the task of finding a clear and single *ratio* even more complex.
The famous case of *Donoghue v Stevenson* [1932] AC 562, which established the modern law of negligence, provides a classic example. Lord Atkin’s formulation of the ‘neighbour principle’ is widely seen as the *ratio* of the case. However, it was a broad and novel statement of principle, and its precise scope and application were not immediately clear. It was a one-way communication whose full meaning had to be debated, refined, and applied in a host of subsequent cases over many decades. The effectiveness of the communication in *Donoghue* was therefore not immediate or total; it was the start of a longer legal conversation, worked out through later cases.
Furthermore, the tools available to judges, such as distinguishing a case on its facts, allow them to avoid following a precedent that appears binding. This demonstrates that the one-way command from a higher court is not absolute. A later judge can effectively ‘talk back’ to the precedent by declaring that the message, while authoritative, does not apply to the new situation. This process of interpretation and application shows that the communication from the prior court is not a simple instruction but a complex text whose relevance and meaning are open to argument, thereby limiting its straightforward effectiveness.
## Conclusion
In conclusion, the statement by Berko, Wolvin and Wolvin (1998) accurately reflects a central dynamic within the English legal system. One-way communication is a structural necessity, forming the basis of legislative authority and the doctrine of precedent. The law needs to be communicated in a clear, final, and authoritative manner to ensure certainty, order, and justice. However, the effectiveness of these one-way communications is fundamentally limited. Statutes, no matter how carefully drafted, are susceptible to ambiguity and require judicial interpretation to function. Likewise, the legal principles within judgments are not always clear, and their application to future cases is a matter of legal argument rather than simple application. The established legal methods of statutory interpretation and the analysis of case law are, in essence, sophisticated systems designed to manage the inherent limitations of one-way communication. They act as the bridge between the authoritative but imperfect message and its practical, effective application, proving that while one-way communication is essential, it is rarely sufficient on its own.
## References
- Berko, R. M., Wolvin, A. D. and Wolvin, D. R. (1998) Communicating: A social and career focus. 7th ed. Houghton Mifflin.
- Dicey, A. V. (1915) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. 8th ed. Macmillan.
- Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
- Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637.
- R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367.
- Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.
- Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB 147.
