Introduction
This advice will consider the potential civil claims Abena may have in tort against Mr. Mensah, the security officers (Kofi and Yaw), and the police officers involved in her detention. The events described took place in Accra, which implies the relevant jurisdiction is Ghanaian law. However, as this advice is prepared from the perspective of an academic specialising in the law of England and Wales, the analysis will be based on English tort law principles. The primary claims available to Abena are false imprisonment, assault, and battery. This advice will first address the potential liability of the store manager and security officers, before turning to the actions of the police.
Liability of Mr. Mensah, Kofi, and Yaw
Abena’s primary claim against the store staff will be for the tort of false imprisonment. She may also have claims for assault and battery against the security officers. The liability of each party, and any potential defences, will be considered in turn.
False Imprisonment at the Store
False imprisonment is an intentional tort which protects an individual’s freedom of movement. It is defined as the ‘unlawful imposition of a constraint on another's freedom of movement from a particular place’ (Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172). To succeed, Abena must show that there was a complete restraint on her liberty, that this was intentional, and that it was unlawful.
The first element requires a total, rather than partial, obstruction of will (Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742). Abena was taken to a security office and the door was locked. The officers stood in front of the door and warned her against trying to leave. Although she was not physically handcuffed, a restraint can be imposed by a threat of force, which leads the claimant to believe they will be physically restrained if they try to leave (Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597). Here, the locked door and the explicit warning from the officers clearly constitute a complete restraint.
The second element is intention. The defendant must have intended the act of restriction, not necessarily to have acted unlawfully. Mr. Mensah intended for Abena to be detained, and Kofi and Yaw intended to carry out that instruction. Therefore, the element of intention is satisfied.
The crucial issue is whether the detention was unlawful. Mr. Mensah may seek to rely on the defence of a citizen’s arrest under section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Theft is an indictable offence, for which a citizen's arrest is potentially available. Section 24A(2) allows a person to arrest anyone whom they have reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of an offence, where that indictable offence has actually been committed. Section 24A(1) allows an arrest of a person in the act of committing an indictable offence, or who is reasonably suspected of being in the act.
In this case, no offence had been committed by Abena, and the other customer had mistakenly reported her handbag as stolen, so it is questionable whether an indictable offence had been committed at all. The central question is whether Mr. Mensah had ‘reasonable grounds’ for his suspicion. The test for reasonable suspicion is objective: were there facts that would lead an ordinary, cautious person to believe the person was guilty? (Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546). Mr. Mensah saw CCTV of Abena carrying a similar handbag. However, he failed to conduct basic further inquiries, such as reviewing the footage of the cashier’s desk or checking sales records, both of which would have quickly shown that Abena had paid for the item. An honest belief is not sufficient; it must be a reasonable one. Given his failure to make simple checks, it is strongly arguable that his suspicion was not based on reasonable grounds.
Furthermore, for a citizen’s arrest to be lawful, two necessity conditions must also be satisfied under s.24A(3) and (4). The person making the arrest must believe it is necessary for a specified reason (e.g., to prevent the person making off), and it must not be reasonably practicable for a constable to make the arrest instead. It is unlikely these conditions were met. Abena was near the exit but had shown no sign of 'making off', and the staff could have called the police and simply observed her until they arrived. The two-hour detention, particularly the delay in calling the police, further weakens the argument that the arrest was necessary.
Therefore, the defence of lawful citizen's arrest is unlikely to succeed. The detention was unlawful, and Abena has a strong claim for false imprisonment against Mr. Mensah, Kofi, and Yaw. As the employees were acting in the course of their employment, their employer, the department store, would also be vicariously liable for their actions.
Assault and Battery
Battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force, while assault is an act causing someone to apprehend the immediate infliction of such force. When Kofi held Abena ‘firmly by the arm’, this constituted a battery, as any physical contact beyond that which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life is sufficient (Collins v Wilcock). When the officers warned her that force would be used if she tried to leave, this would constitute an assault, as it caused her to apprehend immediate unlawful force. As the arrest was likely unlawful, the force used to effect it cannot be justified as lawful. Therefore, Abena has valid claims for assault and battery against Kofi and Yaw.
Liability of the Police
Abena may also have a claim for false imprisonment against the police force for her subsequent detention at the police station.
The first police officer acted appropriately by investigating the allegation at the store, examining the evidence (the receipt and sales records), and concluding that no offence had occurred. Abena was rightly released. Her subsequent attendance at the police station was voluntary.
However, her detention at the station by a different officer raises a separate issue. A police officer has a power of arrest under section 24 of PACE 1984 if they have reasonable grounds for suspecting a person has committed an offence. At the point Abena was detained at the station, the initial investigation had already established her innocence. The second officer was acting on information from Mr. Mensah that was now known to be incorrect.
The House of Lords in O'Hara v Chief Constable of the RUC [1997] AC 286 established that while an officer can rely on information from others (like an informant), the officer must have a genuine suspicion that is objectively reasonable. Here, the police force was already in possession of exonerating information from the first officer's investigation. A police officer cannot simply rely on a citizen's request to arrest someone without forming their own reasonable suspicion. By the time Abena was at the station, there was no objective basis for any suspicion, let alone a reasonable one. The fact that the first officer had cleared her meant that any continued detention based on the same discredited allegation was almost certainly unlawful.
The detention for a further six hours pending ‘further investigations’ had no lawful basis, as there was nothing left to investigate regarding the handbag. Therefore, this detention amounts to false imprisonment, and the police force will be liable for the actions of the second officer.
Conclusion and Advice
In summary, Abena has strong grounds to bring civil claims against several parties.
- Against Mr. Mensah, Kofi, and Yaw, she has a claim for false imprisonment for her two-hour detention in the store. The defence of citizen’s arrest is unlikely to succeed because the suspicion was not based on reasonable grounds and the necessity criteria were not met.
- Against Kofi and Yaw, she has claims for battery (for being held by the arm) and assault (for the threat of force).
- The department store is likely to be vicariously liable for the torts committed by its employees.
- Against the police force, she has a strong claim for false imprisonment for her six-hour detention at the police station, as there were no reasonable grounds for suspicion at that point.
Abena should be advised to commence legal proceedings against the individuals and also their respective employers (the store and the police force), as they have greater resources to pay damages. The likely remedy would be compensatory damages, awarded to reflect the loss of liberty, injury to feelings, and distress caused by the incidents. The duration of each detention will be a key factor in quantifying these damages.
References
Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546
Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172
Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597
O'Hara v Chief Constable of the RUC [1997] AC 286
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
