Introduction
This problem question requires an analysis of several incidents involving Zara, Cle, and Adam, to determine the potential criminal liability of Zara and Adam. The relevant law is primarily the non-fatal offences against the person, governed by the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861) and common law. Each incident will be examined chronologically, applying the legal principles of assault, battery, actual bodily harm (ABH), and grievous bodily harm (GBH) to the conduct of Zara and Adam. The analysis will consider both the *actus reus* (guilty act) and *mens rea* (guilty mind) for each potential offence.
Zara’s Liability towards Cle (Bookend Incident)
The first series of events involves Zara’s actions towards Cle. When Zara raises the bookend and yells, “I’ll make you regret this!”, she may have committed an assault. The *actus reus* of assault is any act which causes the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence. The *mens rea* is an intention to cause such apprehension, or recklessness as to whether such apprehension is caused (R v Venna [1976] QB 421). By raising a heavy object and shouting a threat, Zara’s actions are clearly calculated to make Cle fear she is about to be hit. Words alone can be sufficient for an assault (R v Ireland [1998] AC 147), and here they are combined with a threatening gesture, strengthening the case for assault.
When Zara throws the bookend, leading to Cle cutting her forehead, more serious offences must be considered. The cut constitutes a wound, which is defined as a break in the continuity of the whole skin (JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331). This opens liability under sections 47, 20, and 18 of the OAPA 1861.
A charge under section 47 for Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) seems probable. This requires an assault or battery which ‘occasions’ (causes) ABH. The initial assault is established, as discussed above. The issue of causation must be addressed, as Cle was not directly hit by the bookend. Factual causation is established using the ‘but for’ test: but for Zara throwing the bookend, Cle would not have ducked and hit her head (R v White [1910] 2 KB 124). For legal causation, the harm must be a result of the defendant’s culpable act, and the chain of causation must not be broken. A victim’s reaction will only break the chain if it is ‘so daft’ as to be unforeseeable (R v Roberts [1971] 56 Cr App R 95). Ducking to avoid a heavy object thrown at one’s head is a foreseeable and natural reaction. Therefore, causation is likely established. A cut forehead is certainly ‘actual bodily harm’, which is any injury that is not merely ‘transient and trifling’ (R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498). The *mens rea* for s.47 is simply the *mens rea* for the initial assault or battery; there is no need for the defendant to foresee that ABH would result (R v Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699). As Zara intended to cause apprehension, the *mens rea* is satisfied.
Zara could also face the more serious charge of malicious wounding under section 20 OAPA 1861. The *actus reus* is to unlawfully wound or inflict grievous bodily harm. As established, Cle’s cut is a wound. The *mens rea* for s.20 is ‘maliciously’, which has been interpreted to mean intending some harm, or being reckless as to whether some harm is caused (R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421). It is not necessary to foresee a wound or GBH; foreseeing some minor harm is sufficient (R v Savage; Parmenter [1992]). By throwing a heavy bookend, Zara was clearly at least reckless as to causing some harm to Cle. Therefore, a charge under s.20 is a strong possibility. A charge under section 18 for wounding with intent is less likely, as it would require the prosecution to prove that Zara had the specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm, which means ‘really serious harm’ (DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290). Her words, “I’ll make you regret this!”, are angry but not conclusive of an intent to cause truly serious injury.
Adam’s Liability towards Zara (The Push)
Adam’s push of Zara constitutes a battery, which is the unlawful application of force to another person (*Collins v Wilcock* [1984] 1 WLR 1172). The push caused Zara to fall and briefly lose consciousness. Loss of consciousness, even if temporary, has been held to be ABH (R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689). As the battery caused ABH, Adam is likely liable under s.47 OAPA 1861. The *mens rea* is satisfied as he intended the push (the battery), and as per *Savage; Parmenter*, he does not need to have intended or foreseen the resulting ABH.
Adam might try to raise the defence of defence of another, namely Cle. This defence, contained in common law and clarified in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, allows for the use of reasonable force to prevent an attack on another person. The force used must be necessary, and it must be reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant honestly believed them to be. Adam witnessed Zara’s violent outburst, so he could argue he believed Zara posed a continuing threat to Cle. However, Zara had already thrown the bookend, so the immediate danger might have been seen as having passed. A push may be considered reasonable force to prevent any further attack, but this would be a matter for the jury to decide based on whether the threat was genuinely ongoing.
Zara’s Liability towards Cle (The Stumble)
In this incident, Zara, dazed, stumbles into Cle, causing a badly broken wrist. A broken wrist would certainly be classed as grievous bodily harm (GBH). This raises potential liability under s.20 OAPA 1861. However, the crucial element here is the *mens rea*. To be liable, Zara must have acted ‘maliciously’, meaning she intended or was reckless as to causing some harm.
The facts state that Zara was “still dazed” from being pushed and losing consciousness. Her action of stumbling into Cle may have been an involuntary act. For a defendant to be criminally liable, their actions must be voluntary. If an action is truly involuntary, it does not constitute an *actus reus*. This is related to the defence of automatism, which requires a total loss of voluntary control resulting from an external factor (Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386). Here, the dazed state was caused by Adam’s push, an external factor. If Zara’s stumble was completely involuntary and not controlled by her mind, she would lack both the *actus reus* and the *mens rea* for any offence. It is highly arguable that a person who is dazed and stumbles does not have the necessary intention or recklessness to cause harm. Therefore, it is unlikely that Zara would be found criminally liable for Cle’s broken wrist.
Adam’s Liability towards Zara (Cutting Hair)
Adam’s final act is to cut off a significant portion of Zara’s hair. The question is what, if any, offence this constitutes. In the case of *DPP v Smith* [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin), the High Court confirmed that cutting off a substantial amount of a person’s hair without their consent can amount to ABH under s.47 OAPA 1861. The court reasoned that hair is an attribute of the human body and cutting it is a form of battery that can amount to ABH, as it is an injury to a person’s body in the sense of being an interference with its integrity. Given this authority, the *actus reus* of s.47 is made out. The cutting of the hair is the battery, and the resulting loss of hair is the ABH.
The *mens rea* for s.47 is intention or recklessness as to the initial battery. Adam acted deliberately while Zara was asleep, clearly intending to cut her hair. As established in *Savage; Parmenter*, he does not need to know that this act legally amounts to ABH. His knowledge of her fashion shoot the next day demonstrates his malicious motive, but motive is distinct from *mens rea*. His intention to apply the scissors to her hair is sufficient. Thus, Adam is likely to be liable for s.47 ABH.
Conclusion
In summary, the parties face significant potential criminal liability. Zara is likely liable for assault and for a s.20 malicious wounding charge regarding the throwing of the bookend. However, she is unlikely to be liable for causing Cle’s broken wrist, as her action was arguably involuntary and lacked the necessary *mens rea*. Adam is likely to be found liable on two counts of s.47 ABH. The first is for pushing Zara and causing her to lose consciousness, where his defence of another is plausible but not guaranteed. The second is for cutting Zara’s hair, an act which the law now clearly recognises as capable of constituting actual bodily harm.
References
- Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386.
- Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172.
- Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
- DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290.
- DPP v Smith [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin).
- JJC (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331.
- Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
- R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689.
- R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498.
- R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.
- R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421.
- R v Roberts [1971] 56 Cr App R 95.
- R v Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699.
- R v Venna [1976] QB 421.
- R v White [1910] 2 KB 124.
