Statutory interpretation is the process by which judges determine the meaning of legislation. Parliament is the supreme law-making body in the UK, but the statutes it creates are applied by the judiciary. As language can be ambiguous, this process of interpretation is essential to ensure the law is applied correctly. Over time, the courts have developed several approaches, often referred to as 'rules' of interpretation, to guide them. This essay will explain five key processes: the literal rule, the golden rule, the mischief rule, the purposive approach, and the use of aids and presumptions.
The Literal Rule
The literal rule is the foundational principle of statutory interpretation. It requires judges to give words in a statute their plain, ordinary, and grammatical meaning, even if this leads to an outcome that seems undesirable. This approach respects the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by applying the law exactly as Parliament has written it. A classic example in criminal law is Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394. A shopkeeper was prosecuted under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 for 'offering for sale' a flick-knife which he had displayed in his shop window. Under the law of contract, this display was an 'invitation to treat', not a formal 'offer for sale'. The court applied the literal contractual meaning and found the defendant not guilty, even though this outcome appeared to undermine the Act's intention.
The Golden Rule
The golden rule is a modification of the literal rule, used to avoid a result that is absurd or repugnant. It has two forms. The narrow approach is applied where a word has more than one meaning, and the court chooses the meaning that avoids an absurdity. The wider approach allows the court to modify the words of the statute to avoid a result that would be contrary to public policy or common sense. A key criminal case is R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367, concerning the offence of bigamy. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 stated that 'whosoever being married shall marry any other person' commits bigamy. A literal interpretation would mean the offence is impossible to commit, as a person who is already married cannot legally marry someone else. The court applied the golden rule and interpreted 'shall marry' to mean 'shall go through a ceremony of marriage'.
The Mischief Rule
The mischief rule is the oldest approach, established in Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. It allows the court to look beyond the words of the statute and consider the problem, or 'mischief', that Parliament was trying to remedy when it passed the Act. The court then interprets the Act in a way that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. In Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830, defendants were charged under the Street Offences Act 1959, which made it an offence for a prostitute to 'solicit in a street'. The defendants were soliciting men from a balcony and behind windows. The court found them guilty, holding that the mischief the Act sought to remedy was the harassment of people in public by prostitutes, and it did not matter whether the prostitute was literally in the street or not.
The Purposive Approach
This is the modern approach and a development of the mischief rule. Instead of looking back at the specific problem the Act was designed to fix, judges look for the overall purpose or intention of Parliament when passing the legislation. This approach is more flexible and gives judges greater scope to achieve justice. Its use was greatly influenced by the need to interpret European Union law, which is often drafted in a less precise, more purposive style. A significant development related to this approach was the decision in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, which, in certain limited circumstances, allows courts to consult parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard to help identify Parliament's intention.
Aids and Presumptions of Interpretation
The fifth process is not a single rule but the use of various aids and presumptions to assist interpretation. These are divided into intrinsic and extrinsic aids. Intrinsic aids are found within the Act itself and include the long title, preamble, headings, and schedules. Extrinsic aids are materials found outside the Act, such as dictionaries, law reform reports (e.g., from the Law Commission), and, as mentioned, Hansard. In addition to these aids, judges use a set of presumptions. For example, there is a presumption that Parliament does not intend to take away fundamental rights, and a presumption that a criminal offence requires mens rea (a guilty mind) unless the statute explicitly states otherwise. These aids and presumptions help to provide context and guide the court towards a reasonable interpretation.
In conclusion, judges in the criminal justice system and beyond have several tools at their disposal to interpret statutes. While the literal rule prioritises parliamentary sovereignty, its rigidity can lead to injustice. The golden and mischief rules offer ways to avoid this, while the modern purposive approach gives judges the most discretion to deliver an outcome that aligns with Parliament's overall objective. These approaches, supported by various aids and presumptions, form the complex and vital process of statutory interpretation.
References
Elliott, C. and Quinn, F. (2019) English Legal System. 20th edn. Pearson.
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394.
Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a.
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593.
R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367.
Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830.
