Introduction
The English common law system is built upon the doctrine of judicial precedent, which is governed by the principle of stare decisis. This principle, meaning 'to stand by things decided', ensures that law is developed in a consistent, predictable, and fair manner. It establishes a hierarchy where courts are bound by the decisions of those above them and, in some cases, by their own previous decisions. The statement in question claims that the exceptions to this rule for the Court of Appeal, established in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718, make a 'mockery' of this fundamental principle. This essay will argue that this view is incorrect. The Bristol Aeroplane exceptions are not a mockery of stare decisis; rather, they are a limited and essential set of tools that provide necessary flexibility, correct errors, and ultimately reinforce the integrity of the doctrine of precedent.
The Principle of Stare Decisis
The doctrine of precedent is the bedrock of the English legal system, providing certainty and consistency (Slapper and Kelly, 2017). The principle of stare decisis dictates that the legal reasoning, or ratio decidendi, of a past case is binding on future cases where the material facts are the same. This operates through a strict court hierarchy. The Supreme Court binds all lower courts, and the Court of Appeal binds the courts below it. Crucially, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) is also generally bound by its own past decisions. Without this horizontal precedent, two different divisions of the same court could produce conflicting legal rules, creating confusion for citizens and legal professionals. This self-binding rule forms a key part of the orderly development of law and ensures that litigants can have a reasonable expectation of how the law will be applied.
The Bristol Aeroplane Exceptions
The rule that the Court of Appeal must follow its own previous decisions was firmly established in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718. However, in that same judgment, Lord Greene MR acknowledged that such a rigid rule could lead to the continuation of bad law. He therefore outlined three important but narrow exceptions. The Court of Appeal is not bound by its own precedent if:
- There are two conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal on the same point of law. In this situation, the court must choose which decision to follow, and the other will be overruled.
- A previous decision of the Court of Appeal has been implicitly overruled by a later decision of the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court). If the reasoning of the higher court is fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier Court of Appeal decision, the Court of Appeal must follow the higher court.
- The previous decision was made per incuriam (through lack of care). This applies where the court reached its decision in ignorance of a binding statute or a previous binding case that would have affected the outcome.
These exceptions demonstrate a careful balance between the need for certainty and the need for justice and correctness in the law.
Do the Exceptions Make a Mockery of Stare Decisis?
To suggest the Bristol Aeroplane exceptions make a 'mockery' of stare decisis is a significant overstatement. The exceptions are not a licence for judges to disregard precedent whenever they disagree with it. Instead, they are carefully controlled mechanisms designed to resolve clear problems within the case law.
The first two exceptions are logical necessities. If the Court of Appeal could not resolve a conflict between two of its own past decisions, the law would remain uncertain. Similarly, it would be absurd for the Court of Appeal to be forced to follow its own decision when the Supreme Court has clearly shown that decision to be incorrect. These exceptions are therefore not mocking stare decisis, but serving its ultimate purpose of creating a coherent and predictable body of law.
The per incuriam exception is the one with the most potential for misuse, as it relies on judicial interpretation of whether a previous court acted in error. However, the courts have been very clear that this exception must be applied with extreme caution. For example, in Rickards v Rickards [1990] Fam 194, Lord Donaldson stated that it would be a "drastic step" for the Court of Appeal to declare one of its own decisions per incuriam and that it should only be done in the "rarest of cases". This shows that the judiciary is self-disciplined and views the exceptions as safety valves, not as ways to undermine the core principle of precedent. They exist to correct clear mistakes, not to allow judicial activism to run free.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the doctrine of precedent is essential for stability in the English common law. The statement that the Bristol Aeroplane exceptions make a mockery of stare decisis is unfounded. The exceptions are not wide-ranging invitations to ignore previous decisions. Instead, they represent a pragmatic and constrained solution to the problems that a completely rigid system of precedent would create. By allowing the Court of Appeal to resolve internal conflicts, follow the superior authority of the Supreme Court, and correct manifest errors made per incuriam, the exceptions provide a necessary degree of flexibility. This flexibility does not weaken the doctrine of precedent; it strengthens it by ensuring its application does not lead to absurdity or injustice, thereby maintaining public confidence in the legal system.
References
- Slapper, G. and Kelly, D. (2017) The English Legal System. 18th edn. Routledge.
- Rickards v Rickards [1990] Fam 194.
- Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718.
