Introduction
The English and Welsh legal system provides various forums for the resolution of disputes, with courts of law being the most traditional and recognisable. Alongside the courts, however, exists a parallel system of tribunals, which handle a vast number of cases each year. While both courts and tribunals are state-run bodies that make binding legal decisions, they are not interchangeable. The purpose of this essay is to identify and explain the key features that distinguish tribunals from courts. This will be achieved by comparing their origins and purpose, jurisdiction, personnel, and procedural approaches. It will be argued that despite significant reforms, most notably through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which have made tribunals more ‘court-like’, fundamental distinctions in their function and character remain, ensuring they occupy a unique and vital place in the justice system.
Origins, Purpose and Structure
A primary distinction between courts and tribunals lies in their historical origins and the purpose for which they were created. The traditional court system, comprising the Magistrates’ Courts, County Court, High Court, Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court, is a long-standing feature of the UK’s constitution. Courts have a broad, general authority to deal with all manner of civil disputes and criminal matters that fall within their jurisdiction. Their role is to apply the general law of the land to the cases brought before them.
In contrast, tribunals are a more recent and specific creation. Most were established during the 20th century to deal with the disputes arising from the expansion of the welfare state and increased government regulation (Partington, 2018). Instead of creating new courts or burdening existing ones, Parliament created specialised bodies to adjudicate disputes between the citizen and the state in areas like social security, immigration, and mental health. The Franks Committee Report in 1957 was a landmark review which established the principles that should govern tribunals, emphasising the need for ‘openness, fairness and impartiality’ (Franks, 1957).
A further structural reform was prompted by the Leggatt Report (2001), which found the existing tribunal system to be fragmented and confusing. The report's recommendations led to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007). This Act created a new, simplified structure: a First-tier Tribunal to hear cases at first instance, organised into specialist 'chambers' (e.g., Social Entitlement, Health, Education and Social Care), and an Upper Tribunal to hear appeals. This rationalised system brought tribunals under a unified administrative structure, but their core purpose remains distinct from the courts: to provide specialised adjudication in specific areas of law.
Jurisdiction
The difference in purpose is directly reflected in the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals. The higher courts, such as the High Court, possess an inherent jurisdiction, meaning they have the power to hear any case unless explicitly prohibited by statute. Their authority flows from their constitutional role, not from a specific piece of legislation for each type of case. This allows courts to develop the common law and create new remedies to ensure justice is done in unforeseen circumstances.
Tribunals, by contrast, are creatures of statute. Their jurisdiction is strictly defined and limited by the Act of Parliament that created them or gives them power to hear a particular type of claim. For example, an Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a claim for unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996, but it has no power to hear a related claim for defamation or personal injury, which must be brought in a civil court. As Lord Diplock stated in a case concerning the limits of a tribunal's power, it “has no jurisdiction to do so other than that which the statute confers on it” (R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456, 488). This statutory confinement means tribunals cannot hear novel cases or create remedies beyond what Parliament has authorised, a fundamental limitation not shared by the higher courts.
Personnel and Expertise
The composition of the decision-making panel is another significant distinguishing feature. In courts, cases are presided over by judges (or magistrates in the lowest criminal court) who are legally qualified generalists. A judge in the County Court, for example, may hear cases on contract, tort, and land law all in the same week. They are expected to have a broad knowledge of the law and legal principles. With the exception of juries in certain criminal and civil cases, the decision is made by the legally qualified judge alone.
Tribunals, on the other hand, are characterised by their use of specialist expertise. A typical tribunal panel consists of a legally qualified Tribunal Judge and one or two non-legally qualified lay members who have direct, practical experience in the tribunal’s area of specialism. For instance, in the Social Entitlement Chamber, a case concerning disability benefits might be heard by a judge alongside a medical professional. In an Employment Tribunal, the judge often sits with one panel member from an employer background and another from an employee or trade union background. The Leggatt Report (2001) celebrated this ‘partnership between a legal and a lay expert element’ as a key strength, allowing for a more informed and practical understanding of the technical issues at the heart of the dispute. This composition is intended to produce decisions that are not only legally sound but also grounded in the practical realities of the relevant field.
Procedure and Formality
Historically, the most visible difference for a user was in the procedure and atmosphere. Courts operate under formal and often complex rules of procedure, such as the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR). The process is typically adversarial, with each party presenting their evidence and arguments, which are then tested through cross-examination. This formality, combined with the traditional courtroom setting, can be intimidating and costly, and often necessitates legal representation.
Tribunals were conceived as a deliberate alternative to this formality. The aim was to create a system that was quicker, cheaper, and more accessible, particularly for individuals representing themselves against a government department or an employer. The Leggatt Report (2001) recommended that the new tribunal system should “avoid the formality of traditional courts”. Procedures are typically more flexible, and the rules of evidence are less strictly applied. The judge may take a more inquisitorial or interventionist role, helping to identify the issues and ensure an unrepresented party can present their case effectively.
However, the TCEA 2007 has blurred this distinction. The creation of the Upper Tribunal as a superior court of record, with its decisions forming binding a precedent, has introduced a greater degree of formality and legalism, a process known as 'courtification'. In R (on the application of Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, the Supreme Court recognised the Upper Tribunal's expertise and status, holding that its decisions should only be subject to judicial review in the High Court in exceptional circumstances. This effectively placed the Upper Tribunal on a similar footing to the High Court in the judicial hierarchy, signifying a departure from the traditional, less formal model. While First-tier Tribunals often retain a more informal atmosphere, the system as a whole is now more akin to the court structure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the reforms of the TCEA 2007 have aligned tribunals more closely with the court system, significant features continue to distinguish them. The fundamental differences lie in their origins and purpose, with courts being generalist arbiters of the law and tribunals being specialist bodies created by statute for specific policy areas. This is reflected in their respective jurisdictions, with courts possessing a broad, inherent jurisdiction compared to the strict statutory remit of tribunals. Furthermore, the use of expert lay members on tribunal panels contrasts with the legally qualified, generalist judges of the courts. Finally, although a degree of 'courtification' has occurred, tribunals generally still aim for a more informal and accessible procedure than is found in the traditional courts. Therefore, it is accurate to say that while the gap has narrowed, tribunals remain a distinct, specialised, and essential component of the justice system in England and Wales, providing a tailored form of dispute resolution that the ordinary courts are not equipped to deliver.
References
- Elliott, C. and Quinn, F. (2018) English Legal System. 19th ed. Pearson.
- Franks, O. (1957) Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries. Cmnd 218. HMSO.
- Leggatt, A. (2001) Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service. The Stationery Office.
- Partington, M. (2018) Introduction to the English Legal System 2018-2019. 13th ed. Oxford University Press.
- R (on the application of Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28.
- R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456.
- Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
- Employment Rights Act 1996.
