The Indian Constitution establishes a system of governance which is often described as ‘quasi-federal’ or a federal system with a strong centralising tendency. While the Constitution provides a detailed framework for the division of powers between the Union (Centre) and the States, this essay will argue that the statement in the question holds significant merit. In recent years, the practical functioning of Indian federalism has shown that the quality of intergovernmental cooperation is an increasingly decisive factor in shaping Centre-State relations, often overshadowing the formal constitutional text. This will be examined through recent examples concerning fiscal arrangements and public health management.
The Constitutional Framework of Federalism
The Constitution of India delineates a clear, albeit asymmetrical, division of powers. The Seventh Schedule, read with Article 246, distributes legislative competence across three lists: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. This structure is intended to provide states with a degree of autonomy in their specified domain. However, numerous provisions tilt the balance of power in favour of the Centre. These include the power of Parliament to legislate on state subjects in the national interest (Article 249), the appointment of State Governors by the President (Article 155), and the imposition of President’s Rule (Article 356), which allows the Centre to take over a state’s administration. This constitutional design creates a framework where states are structurally dependent on the Centre, making cooperation essential for the smooth functioning of government (Singh, 2017). The formal provisions, therefore, establish a system where intergovernmental relations are not a matter of choice, but a necessity built into the constitutional structure itself.
The Primacy of Cooperation in Recent Practice
While the constitutional provisions are static, the political and economic context in which they operate is dynamic. Recent events have highlighted how the quality of cooperation between the Centre and states determines the real-world application of federal principles. The introduction and management of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a prime example. The GST regime, brought about by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, created the GST Council, a body comprising the Union Finance Minister and state finance ministers. This body is constitutionally designed to be a forum for cooperative federalism, making joint decisions on taxation.
However, the functioning of the GST Council has demonstrated the fragility of this cooperation. Disputes have repeatedly arisen over the issue of compensation for revenue shortfalls experienced by states. The Centre’s initial reluctance and delays in paying the promised compensation led to significant friction, with several state governments publicly criticising the Union for failing to honour its commitments (Tillin, 2020). This shows that even where the Constitution creates a cooperative mechanism, its effectiveness is entirely dependent on the political goodwill and trust between the parties involved. When cooperation breaks down, the constitutional framework alone is insufficient to resolve disputes, leading to a strain on the federal relationship.
Cooperation and Conflict during the COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic provided another test for India’s federal structure. The Centre invoked the Disaster Management Act 2005 to impose a nationwide lockdown, a move which some argued encroached upon the states’ powers in areas like public health. Throughout the crisis, the success of the public health response depended heavily on coordination between central directives and state-level implementation. However, this period was marked by conflicts over vaccine procurement and allocation, oxygen supply, and the sharing of data. State governments often complained of a lack of consultation and unilateral decision-making by the Centre. This experience suggests that in times of national crisis, the lines of authority drawn by the Constitution become blurred, and the ability to manage the situation is determined not by legal provisions, but by the capacity of different levels of government to work together effectively. The frequent discord showed that a lack of cooperation can lead to policy failures and undermine the federal spirit.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the Constitution of India provides the foundational structure for the country’s federal system, its provisions alone do not define the nature of Centre-State relations. The constitutional framework, with its inherent centralising bias, necessitates a high degree of intergovernmental cooperation. As recent examples from GST administration and the pandemic response demonstrate, the practical reality of Indian federalism is dictated by the quality of this cooperation. When trust and collaboration prevail, the system can function effectively. However, when relations are strained by political or fiscal disagreements, the cooperative mechanisms falter, and the federal structure comes under pressure. Therefore, the statement is largely accurate: the feature and future of Indian federalism are indeed determined less by the fixed text of the Constitution and more by the fluid, dynamic, and often fraught quality of intergovernmental cooperation.
References
- Singh, M.P. (2017) ‘The federal scheme’, in M.P. Singh and V.N. Shukla (eds.), V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India. 13th edn. Lucknow: Eastern Book Company.
- Tillin, L. (2020) ‘Indian federalism after the pandemic’, India in Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.
- Constitution of India, 1950.
- Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016.
- Disaster Management Act 2005.
