Introduction
The right to freedom of expression is a cornerstone of any democratic society, enabling public debate, holding power to account, and fostering personal development. In Sierra Leone, this right saw a significant advancement with the 2020 repeal of the criminal and seditious libel provisions in the Public Order Act 1965, a move widely celebrated by media practitioners and human rights advocates (Amnesty International, 2020). However, the subsequent enactment of the Cybercrime and Security Act in 2021 (hereafter ‘the Act’) has raised substantial concerns. This essay will critically examine the extent to which this Act undermines the right to freedom of expression in Sierra Leone. It will argue that while the legislation purports to address genuine security threats in the digital age, several of its provisions are vaguely worded and overly broad, creating significant potential for abuse that could chill legitimate expression and curtail the work of journalists and activists. The Act, therefore, represents a worrying step back from the progressive reforms of 2020, even if its intentions were legitimate.
The Constitutional and International Basis for Freedom of Expression
The right to freedom of expression in Sierra Leone is primarily protected by domestic and international law. Section 25(1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 states that "no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression," which includes the freedom to hold opinions, receive and impart ideas, and freedom from interference with correspondence. This constitutional guarantee is the fundamental legal standard against which any legislative restriction must be measured.
Furthermore, Sierra Leone is a signatory to international treaties that protect this right. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) upholds the right to freedom of expression, stating that it can only be restricted under specific conditions. Any such restrictions must be provided for by law and be necessary "for respect of the rights or reputations of others" or "for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals" (UN General Assembly, 1966). This establishes a high threshold, requiring restrictions to be precise, proportionate, and serve a legitimate aim. It is against this backdrop that the provisions of the Cybercrime and Security Act 2021 must be assessed.
The Aims of the Act versus its Problematic Provisions
The stated objective of the Cybercrime and Security Act 2021 is to provide a comprehensive legal framework for "the prohibition and prevention of cybercrime, for the promotion of cybersecurity," and to facilitate the collection of electronic evidence (Cybercrime and Security Act 2021, Long Title). There is no doubt that cybercrimes such as fraud, hacking, and child exploitation are serious issues that require a modern legislative response. In this sense, the Act can be seen as a necessary tool for law enforcement to tackle new forms of criminality that transcend physical borders.
However, the problem lies not in the Act’s overall intention but in the drafting of specific sections which appear to go beyond tackling clear-cut criminal activity. Several provisions contain broad and subjective language that can be easily interpreted to penalise legitimate online speech, including journalism and political dissent. A key example is Section 44, which deals with cyber-stalking and harassment. Section 44(1)(c) makes it an offence for a person to knowingly communicate indirectly or directly with another person if the communication causes that person "annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety". The use of subjective terms like "annoyance" and "inconvenience" is deeply problematic. Journalism, by its nature, can be inconvenient for those in power, and public debate often involves expressing opinions that others may find annoying. As noted by the press freedom organisation, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), such language creates an unacceptable risk that the law will be used to target critical reporting and commentary (CPJ, 2021). A politician who is the subject of an investigative report could, for instance, claim that the journalist’s repeated questions and publications cause them "needless anxiety," thereby initiating a criminal complaint under this section.
This vagueness contravenes the principle of legal certainty, a key component of the rule of law, which requires that individuals must be able to foresee the consequences of their actions. When a law criminalises causing "annoyance," it becomes almost impossible for a citizen, journalist, or activist to know whether their online post will be deemed illegal. This uncertainty can lead to a "chilling effect," where individuals self-censor for fear of falling foul of the law, thereby stifling public discourse on matters of national importance.
Powers of Interception and their Impact on Privacy
Beyond the creation of vague offences, the Act grants extensive powers to the state to intercept and access private data, which has a direct and undermining effect on freedom of expression. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act empower authorities, with a warrant or court order, to compel service providers to intercept and collect real-time data, including the content of communications. While judicial oversight is included, the grounds for granting such an order are broad, tied to the investigation of any offence under the Act.
These powers pose a grave threat to journalistic source protection, which is a vital component of press freedom. A key function of the media is to expose corruption and wrongdoing, which often relies on whistleblowers and confidential sources who will only speak if their anonymity is guaranteed. If journalists’ communications can be easily intercepted, sources will be deterred from coming forward, and investigative journalism will be severely hampered. The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) raised this exact concern during the legislative process, arguing that the Act did not contain adequate safeguards to protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources (SLAJ, 2021).
Moreover, the knowledge that the state has the power to monitor digital communications can create a pervasive climate of fear among the general population. This undermines the "freedom from interference with his correspondence" guaranteed by Section 25 of the Constitution. When citizens feel they are being watched, they are less likely to express dissenting opinions or engage in sensitive political discussions online, which diminishes the quality and vibrancy of the democratic space.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Cybercrime and Security Act 2021, while addressing the valid need to combat online crime in Sierra Leone, extends its reach to a degree that significantly undermines the constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression. The primary issue lies in the Act’s use of ambiguous and overbroad language, particularly in offences like 'harassment', which criminalises subjective feelings such as "annoyance". Such provisions are ripe for abuse and can be weaponised against journalists, political opponents, and ordinary citizens to silence criticism and dissent. The extensive surveillance powers granted by the Act further threaten privacy and the ability of the media to perform its watchdog role effectively.
The passing of the Act just one year after the celebrated repeal of criminal libel laws suggests a concerning pattern of giving with one hand while taking with the other. While the government has defended the law as essential for national security, the lack of precision in its drafting fails to meet the test of necessity and proportionality required under international human rights law. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the Act represents a legal instrument that, regardless of its original intent, has created a potent tool for the suppression of free expression in Sierra Leone’s burgeoning digital public sphere.
References
Amnesty International (2020) Sierra Leone: Parliament abolishes the death penalty and repeals seditious libel law in a big win for human rights. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/sierra-leone-parliament-abolishes-the-death-penalty-and-repeals-seditious-libel-law-in-a-big-win-for-human-rights/ (Accessed: 15 October 2023).
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2021) Sierra Leone authorities must ensure new cybercrime law doesn’t stifle press freedom. [Online] Available at: https://cpj.org/2021/07/sierra-leone-authorities-must-ensure-new-cybercrime-law-doesnt-stifle-press-freedom/ (Accessed: 15 October 2023).
Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991.
Cybercrime and Security Act 2021 (Sierra Leone).
Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) (2021) ‘SLAJ Position on the Cyber Security and Crime Act 2021’, in Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development, A Ticking Time Bomb: Analysing the potential impact of the Cybercrime Act 2021 on the media in Sierra Leone. CJID. [Online] Available at: https://cjzd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/A-Ticking-Time-Bomb.pdf (Accessed: 15 October 2023).
UN General Assembly (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
