It is not possible to identify a case named “reakoto” in the law reports of the United Kingdom or other major common law jurisdictions. It is possible that this is a misspelling of a party’s name or a misunderstanding of a case title. However, the question’s focus on the “rule of law” suggests it may refer to a prominent constitutional case that generated significant debate on this topic. One of the most significant recent cases in this area is *R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister* and *Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland* [2019] UKSC 41, often referred to as *Miller/Cherry (No. 2)*. This essay will proceed on the assumption that “reakoto” is a reference to this case and will discuss whether the Supreme Court’s decision was a “slap on the face of the rule of law”. This essay will argue that while the decision was seen by some as a political intervention, it is better understood as an orthodox application of constitutional principles designed to uphold, not undermine, the rule of law.
The rule of law is a core principle of the UK’s constitution. Although it has many definitions, a key aspect, as explained by Lord Bingham, is that everyone, including the government, is subject to the law (Bingham, 2010). It requires that public bodies act within their legal powers. The *Miller/Cherry (No. 2)* case concerned the Prime Minister’s advice to Her Majesty the Queen to prorogue, or suspend, Parliament for five weeks in the run-up to the Brexit deadline. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the courts could rule on the lawfulness of this advice and, if so, what the legal standard was for doing so. The Court concluded unanimously that the advice was unlawful because it had the effect of frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the government to account, without any reasonable justification being provided.
One perspective is that this decision was indeed a “slap on the face of the rule of law” because it represented a departure from the proper constitutional role of the courts. This argument holds that the judiciary overstepped the separation of powers by interfering in what was essentially a political dispute between the executive and Parliament. Prorogation has historically been a matter of “high policy” and a prerogative power, an area where courts have traditionally been reluctant to intervene (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374). Critics argued that the Court had created a new legal test for judging the Prime Minister’s advice, making the law retrospectively and undermining legal certainty, which is another important part of the rule of law. From this viewpoint, the Court abandoned its neutral position and entered the political arena, which damages its legitimacy and the balance of the constitution.
However, the better view is that the Supreme Court’s judgment was a vindication of the rule of law, not an attack on it. The Court itself stated that its decision was not about entering the political fray but about ensuring the government did not use its powers to undermine the fundamentals of the constitution. The two fundamental principles at stake were parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. The Court reasoned that if the executive could suspend Parliament for any reason and for any length of time, it could effectively govern without scrutiny, destroying accountability. The Court was not questioning the *political wisdom* of the prorogation, but its *legality* in relation to its effect on the constitutional role of Parliament. As the judgment explained, “the courts have a responsibility to determine the legal limits of the powers conferred on the executive” (*Miller/Cherry (No. 2)*, at [39]). By preventing the executive from silencing the legislature without good reason, the Court was upholding the very system of checks and balances that the rule of law is designed to protect.
In conclusion, the claim that the *Miller/Cherry (No. 2)* decision was a “slap on the face of the rule of law” is based on a view that the courts should not intervene in political matters. This view, however, misunderstands the Court’s role. The Supreme Court was not making a political judgment but a legal one about the limits of executive power within the UK’s constitutional framework. By confirming that even prerogative powers are limited by the need to respect the constitutional role of Parliament, the judgment reinforced the principle that government is subject to the law. Therefore, far from undermining the rule of law, the decision in *Miller/Cherry (No. 2)* was a necessary and powerful affirmation of it.
References
- Bingham, T. (2010) The Rule of Law. Allen Lane.
- Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
- R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41.
