Introduction
The question of whether Zambia can adopt a different "presidential system of voting" requires careful interpretation. Zambia already operates under a presidential system of government, where the President is both head of state and head of government, distinct from the legislature (Siwale, 2017). Therefore, the question is best understood as concerning the electoral system used to elect the President, rather than the fundamental structure of government. Zambia has, in its recent history, altered its presidential electoral system, most notably through the constitutional amendments of 2016. This demonstrates that change is not only possible but has a precedent. This essay will argue that Zambia can legally adopt a different presidential voting system, as the power to do so is enshrined within its own constitutional framework. However, the legal process for such a change is stringent, requiring significant political consensus, and is subject to the specific amendment procedures laid out in the Constitution of Zambia. This essay will first outline the current presidential electoral system in Zambia. It will then analyse the constitutional mechanisms for legal reform, before examining the historical and political context of electoral changes to illustrate the practical challenges involved.
Zambia's Current Presidential Electoral System
To understand how the voting system can be changed, it is first necessary to establish what the current system is. Following decades of using a simple plurality or First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, Zambia enacted significant constitutional reforms in 2016. The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, No. 2 of 2016, introduced a majoritarian electoral system for the presidency.
The key feature of the current system is stipulated in Article 101(1) of the Constitution of Zambia, which states that a presidential election shall be held where a "presidential candidate receives more than fifty percent of the valid votes cast" (Constitution of Zambia, 1991, as amended 2016). This is commonly referred to as the "50%+1" rule. If no candidate achieves this threshold in the first round of voting, a second ballot must be held within thirty-seven days between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes. This two-round system was a fundamental departure from the previous FPTP system, under which a candidate could win the presidency with less than a majority of the popular vote, as seen in the 2015 presidential by-election (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010).
Furthermore, the 2016 amendments introduced the concept of a running mate. Under Article 110, each presidential candidate must nominate a running mate who becomes Vice-President if that candidate is elected. This was intended to provide for a smoother succession in the event of the presidency becoming vacant, avoiding the need for costly by-elections. These provisions in Articles 101 and 110 form the core of Zambia's current presidential voting system, and any proposal to "adopt" a different system would require the amendment of these specific constitutional articles.
The Constitutional Pathway for Electoral Reform
The central question of whether Zambia can change this system is answered by its own supreme law. The Constitution itself provides the mechanism for its own amendment. The relevant procedure is detailed in Article 79 of the Constitution of Zambia. This article establishes a rigid but clear process for altering the nation’s foundational legal text.
Article 79 stipulates that a bill to amend the Constitution must be passed by the National Assembly with the support of at least two-thirds of all its members at both the second and third readings. This high threshold ensures that fundamental changes to the state's governance structure are not made lightly and require a broad political consensus within the legislature (Ndulo, 2016).
Crucially, Article 79(3) creates an even higher bar for amending certain parts of the Constitution. Any amendment to Part III (the Bill of Rights) or to Article 79 itself requires not only the two-thirds parliamentary supermajority but also approval through a national referendum. However, the articles governing the presidential electoral system, such as Article 101 (Election of President) and Article 110 (Running Mate), are located in Part VIII of the Constitution. As these articles are not part of the Bill of Rights, their amendment does not constitutionally mandate a referendum.
Therefore, from a purely legal and procedural standpoint, Zambia can adopt a different presidential voting system by passing a constitutional amendment bill that alters or replaces Articles 101 and 110. Such a bill would need to secure the votes of at least two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly. This is a difficult but achievable political task, as demonstrated by the successful passage of the 2016 amendments themselves.
The Political Reality of Constitutional Amendment
While the legal pathway is clear, the political context in which such reforms are attempted is determinative of their success. The history of constitutional reform in Zambia is fraught with political contestation, illustrating the practical difficulties of meeting the high amendment thresholds. The move to the 50%+1 system in 2016 was itself the culmination of a long and contentious debate. Proponents argued it would ensure the president had a genuine majority mandate, thereby enhancing political legitimacy and potentially reducing post-election tensions (Kaaba, 2016). Opponents raised concerns about the cost of potential run-off elections and argued it could encourage ethnic or regional voting blocs in the second round.
More recently, the failed attempt to pass the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, No. 10 of 2019 (commonly known as Bill 10) serves as a powerful case study. The Bill proposed a wide range of constitutional changes, including alterations to the electoral system, the re-introduction of deputy ministers, and changes to the judiciary's structure. Despite being government-backed, the Bill was highly controversial, with civil society organisations, opposition parties, and the Law Association of Zambia raising serious concerns that it would undermine democratic governance and excessively strengthen the executive (Sishuwa, 2020). After a prolonged and divisive political battle, the Bill failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority in Parliament in October 2020.
This failure demonstrates that even with a parliamentary majority, a ruling party cannot unilaterally alter the constitution. The high threshold set by Article 79 forces negotiation and consensus-building, acting as a safeguard against changes that lack broad support. Any future attempt to change the presidential voting system—for instance, by reverting to FPTP or introducing an alternative like the Alternative Vote—would face a similar political test. Proponents would have to build a compelling public and cross-party case for reform, demonstrating that the proposed new system is preferable to the current 50%+1 model.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Zambia can, in legal and constitutional terms, adopt a different presidential system of voting. The nation is not permanently bound to the 50%+1, two-round system introduced in 2016. The legal instrument for this change is a constitutional amendment, governed by the procedures in Article 79 of the Constitution of Zambia. As the relevant electoral provisions fall outside the specially entrenched Bill of Rights, such an amendment would require a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly, but not necessarily a national referendum. This process ensures that any change has substantial backing within the legislature.
However, the legal possibility of reform is heavily constrained by political reality. As the successful 2016 reforms and the failed Bill 10 of 2019 demonstrate, securing the necessary two-thirds majority is a formidable challenge that requires extensive political negotiation and consensus. Therefore, while the answer to the question "Can Zambia adopt the presidential system of voting?" is a clear "yes", this is qualified by the significant political hurdles that any such reform proposal must overcome. The ability to change the system is a feature of Zambia's constitutional sovereignty, but the exercise of that ability depends entirely on the political will to forge the broad consensus that the Constitution wisely demands.
References
Cheeseman, N. and Hinfelaar, M. (2010) ‘A new start for Zambia? The 2008 presidential election’, African Affairs, 109(434), pp. 135-146.
Constitution of Zambia, 1991 (as amended by Act No. 2 of 2016).
Kaaba, O. (2016) ‘The 2016 Constitution of Zambia: A new dawn?’, Southern African Public Law, 31(2), pp. 1-22.
Ndulo, M. (2016) ‘The Zambian Constitutional Court: A new kid on the block’, in M. T. Lipeleke (ed.) Zambia's Constitutional Journey: The Fourth Republic. Lusaka: University of Zambia Press.
Sishuwa, S. (2020) ‘The politics of constitution-making in Zambia: A case study of the failed 2019 Constitutional Amendment Bill Number 10’, Social Dynamics, 46(3), pp. 317-334.
Siwale, T. (2017) Politics and Government in Zambia. Lusaka: Maiden Publishing House.
