# If a Constitution has these characteristics legitimacy, respect, obedience and commanding loyalty why is the Constitution failing to stand time in Zambia
## Introduction
A constitution is intended to be the supreme law of a nation, a foundational document that provides stability, legitimacy, and a framework for governance. Ideally, it should command respect and loyalty, ensuring its own endurance. However, the constitutional history of Zambia since its independence in 1964 has been characterised by frequent and often contentious reforms, leading to a succession of constitutional arrangements that have failed to stand the test of time. This essay will argue that Zambia’s constitutions have struggled to achieve permanence primarily due to three interconnected factors: the dominance of the executive branch in the political system, a flawed and non-inclusive constitutional review process, and a persistent gap between the constitution’s text and the country’s political reality.
## Executive Dominance and Political Expediency
A significant reason for constitutional instability in Zambia has been the tendency for the executive branch to initiate or manipulate constitutional reforms for political advantage. Rather than serving as a neutral charter for the nation, the constitution has often been treated as a tool by the ruling party to consolidate power. This practice began early in Zambia’s history with the introduction of the 1973 Constitution, which formally established a one-party state under President Kenneth Kaunda, effectively eliminating political opposition through constitutional means (Ndulo, 2001).
This pattern continued after the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991. The 1996 constitutional amendments, for example, included a controversial ‘parentage clause’ that was widely seen as being targeted at preventing Kaunda from contesting the presidency (Bratton, 1998). More recently, constitutional debates have been dominated by issues such as presidential powers and term limits, reflecting the interests of the incumbent rather than a broader national consensus. When a constitution is perceived as an instrument for partisan gain, it loses its legitimacy and is unlikely to command the loyalty of those in opposition or the wider public. Consequently, each new government or political movement sees the need to overhaul the constitution to correct perceived injustices or to secure its own position, perpetuating a cycle of instability.
## A Flawed and Politicised Reform Process
The process by which constitutions are made is fundamental to their legitimacy. A durable constitution typically emerges from a process that is participatory, inclusive, and reflects a broad consensus. In Zambia, however, the process of constitutional review has been consistently flawed and subject to executive control. The standard procedure has involved the appointment of a Constitutional Review Commission to gather public submissions, which then presents a report and a draft constitution to the President. However, the government is not bound by these recommendations and can accept or reject them through a government White Paper (Ibrahim, 2011).
This ‘executive-led’ process means that popular recommendations, such as those for a stronger legislature, a more independent judiciary, or a reduction in presidential powers, are frequently diluted or ignored by the government of the day. For example, several commissions, including the Mung’omba Constitutional Review Commission, recommended that the final constitution be adopted by a constituent assembly, a body representing diverse national interests. This recommendation has consistently been rejected by the executive, which prefers to retain control through Parliament where it typically holds a majority (Ndulo, 2008). This failure to adopt a people-driven process means that the resulting constitution lacks popular ownership. It is not seen as an agreement by ‘we the people’, but rather as a document imposed by the ruling elite, which undermines its ability to command widespread respect and obedience.
## The Disconnect Between Constitutionalism and Political Practice
Finally, Zambia’s constitutions have struggled to endure because there is often a wide gulf between the principles enshrined in the text and the day-to-day political reality. While the constitutions have typically included provisions for the rule of law, separation of powers, and fundamental human rights, the practice of governance has often failed to uphold these ideals. State institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement, have at times been perceived as lacking independence from political influence, weakening their ability to enforce the constitution against the executive.
When citizens see that the lofty principles of the constitution do not protect them, or that political leaders can act with impunity, their respect for the document is eroded. The constitution becomes seen as an aspirational or symbolic text, rather than a binding set of rules that governs the exercise of power (Fombad, 2013). This disconnect means the constitution fails to become deeply embedded in the nation’s political culture. Without this cultural embedding, there is little popular resistance when political actors seek to amend or replace it for their own ends, contributing to its failure to stand the test of time.
## Conclusion
In conclusion, the premise that a constitution should possess legitimacy, respect, and loyalty to ensure its durability is correct. However, Zambia’s experience demonstrates that these qualities are not automatic. The nation’s constitutional instability is a direct result of a political culture where executive dominance allows for the constitution to be altered for partisan purposes. This is compounded by a top-down, non-inclusive reform process that denies the populace a sense of ownership over the final document. Furthermore, the failure of successive governments to adhere to the principles of constitutionalism has devalued the constitution in the eyes of the public. Until a future constitutional reform process is genuinely people-driven, protected from executive manipulation, and results in a document that is respected and upheld by all political actors, Zambia is likely to continue its search for an enduring constitution.
## References
- Bratton, M. (1998) ‘Second Elections in Africa’, Journal of Democracy, 9(3), pp. 51-66.
- Fombad, C. M. (2013) ‘The Vicissitudes of Constitution-Making in a ‘Protracted’ Transition: The Case of Zambia’, Stellenbosch Law Review, 24(1), pp. 119-140.
- Ibrahim, M. (2011) ‘Constitutional Reform Process in Kenya and Zambia: A Comparative Analysis’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(20), pp. 209-218.
- Ndulo, M. (2001) ‘The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for the Twenty-First Century’, Zambia Law Journal, 33, pp. 1-33.
- Ndulo, M. (2008) ‘The Zambian Constitution and the Search for a Durable One’, in M. Ndulo and R. B. Kent (eds.) New Constitutionalism in Africa: A Search for an Enduring Model. New York: Routledge.
