Introduction
This advice will consider whether a binding contract has been formed between Peters and Chanda, which would entitle Chanda to the K10 000 reward. To establish a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance of that offer, consideration, and an intention to create legal relations. This analysis will examine each of these elements in turn, with particular focus on the nature of the advertisement as a unilateral offer, the validity of Chanda’s acceptance, the timing of his claim, and whether his actions constitute sufficient consideration. The conclusion will be that Chanda likely has no contractual right to the reward due to several significant legal obstacles.
The Advertisement as a Unilateral Offer
The first issue to determine is the legal status of the advertisement placed by Peters in the Post Newspaper. Advertisements are generally considered to be invitations to treat, not offers.1 An invitation to treat is an invitation for others to make offers, which the original party can then accept or reject. The case of *Partridge v Crittenden*2 established this principle, where an advertisement for the sale of wild birds was held to be an invitation to treat. If this general rule applied, Peters’ advertisement would merely be an invitation to the public to provide him with offers of information.
However, there is a key exception to this rule for unilateral offers. A unilateral offer is one made to the world at large, where the offeror promises to pay if the offeree performs a specified act. Acceptance occurs through the performance of that act, and there is no need to communicate an intention to accept beforehand. The classic authority for this is *Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co*,3 in which the defendant company advertised a £100 reward for anyone who used their smoke ball as directed and still contracted influenza. The court held that the advertisement was a unilateral offer because it demonstrated a clear intention to be bound, as evidenced by the deposit of £1,000 in a bank.
Applying this to the present facts, Peters’ advertisement states that a “reward of K10 000 will be given to any person who provides information leading to the recovery of the car”. This is not an invitation to negotiate; it is a clear promise in exchange for an act. The language used is certain and indicates an intention to be bound to anyone who performs the condition of providing the necessary information. Therefore, the advertisement is not an invitation to treat but a unilateral offer made to the world, which could be accepted by any person who fulfilled its conditions.
Acceptance of the Offer
For a contract to be formed, an offer must be accepted. In the context of a unilateral offer, acceptance is achieved by fully performing the requested act.4 In this case, the act required is providing “information leading to the recovery of the car”. Chanda did find the car, which is the ultimate form of information leading to its recovery. However, a crucial requirement for valid acceptance is that the offeree must have knowledge of the offer at the time of performance. An act done in ignorance of an offer cannot constitute acceptance.
The leading authority on this point is the Australian case of *R v Clarke*,5 which is highly persuasive in Commonwealth jurisdictions. In that case, a reward was offered for information leading to the arrest of certain murderers. Clarke gave the information, but admitted at trial that he had done so to clear his own name and had forgotten about the reward at the time. The High Court of Australia held that he was not entitled to the reward, as his actions were not done in reliance on or in response to the offer. Acceptance requires a ‘meeting of the minds’, and one cannot assent to an offer of which they are unaware.
On the facts, Chanda finds the car, and it is only afterwards that “His best friend Banda tells him about the reward”. This means that at the moment he performed the act which would constitute acceptance—finding the car—he was ignorant of Peters’ offer. His actions were not a response to the advertisement. Following the reasoning in *R v Clarke*, Chanda cannot be said to have accepted the offer. The fact that he subsequently learned of the offer and tried to claim the reward is irrelevant, as the acceptance (the act of finding the car) was already complete and was not motivated by the offer. This presents a major obstacle to Chanda’s claim and is likely to be fatal to it.
Furthermore, the offer specifies that the reward must be “claimed by 31st January”. Chanda posted his letter of claim on 25 January, but it did not arrive until 2 February. This raises the question of whether the postal acceptance rule applies. The postal rule, established in *Adams v Lindsell*,6 states that acceptance is complete as soon as the letter is posted. However, this rule can be excluded by the offeror. In *Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes*,7 it was held that a requirement for “notice in writing” to be given by a certain date meant that the notice had to be received by that date, thus ousting the postal rule. Peters’ requirement that the reward be “claimed by 31st January” could be interpreted as requiring actual receipt of the claim by that date. If this interpretation is correct, Chanda’s claim, which arrived on 2 February, is out of time and the offer has lapsed. This provides another ground on which his claim may fail.
Consideration and Pre-Existing Public Duty
Even if it were found that Chanda had validly accepted the offer, he would still need to show that he provided consideration. Consideration is the price for which the promise of the other is bought.8 A promise to perform, or the performance of, a pre-existing public duty does not amount to good consideration. This principle was established in *Collins v Godefroy*,9 where a promise to pay a witness who was already under a legal duty to attend court was held to be unenforceable for lack of consideration.
However, if a person does more than their existing public duty requires, this can amount to good consideration. In *Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council*,10 the police provided a garrison for a colliery during a strike, which went beyond their public duty to maintain order, and so the promise to pay for this extra service was enforceable.
In this scenario, Chanda is a policeman. The finding of a stolen car falls squarely within the general duties of a police officer. The facts state simply that he “finds the car”. There is no information to suggest that he went beyond his ordinary public duty. For example, there is no mention of him using his own time, taking special risks, or doing anything more than what would be expected of a competent police officer. As he was simply performing his existing public duty, he has not provided any new consideration for Peters’ promise of a reward. Following the principle in *Collins v Godefroy*, his performance of this duty is not sufficient to support a contract. Therefore, even if there was a valid acceptance, the contract would likely fail for want of consideration.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Chanda is very unlikely to have a contractual right to the K10 000 reward. While Peters’ advertisement does constitute a valid unilateral offer, Chanda’s claim fails on at least two, and possibly three, significant grounds.
First, and most decisively, Chanda was not aware of the offer at the time he found the car. Based on the principle in *R v Clarke*, an act performed in ignorance of an offer cannot be a valid acceptance.
Second, as a policeman, finding a stolen car is part of Chanda’s pre-existing public duty. He has not done anything to exceed this duty and therefore has not provided good consideration for Peters’ promise, rendering it unenforceable.
Third, it is arguable that his claim was not made within the specified time limit. The condition that the reward be “claimed by 31st January” likely required receipt of the claim by Peters by that date, which did not happen. While the other two points are stronger, this further weakens Chanda’s position. The fact that the car was severely damaged is irrelevant, as the offer was for its recovery, not its recovery in a specific condition. Therefore, my advice to Chanda would be that he has no legal basis to claim the reward.
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Footnotes
1 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (10th edn, OUP 2022) 54.
2 *Partridge v Crittenden* [1968] 1 WLR 1204.
3 *Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co* [1893] 1 QB 256.
4 ibid 262 (Lindley LJ).
5 *R v Clarke* (1927) 40 CLR 227.
6 *Adams v Lindsell* (1818) 1 B & Ald 681.
7 *Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes* [1974] 1 WLR 155.
8 *Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd* [1915] AC 847, 855 (Lord Dunedin).
9 *Collins v Godefroy* (1831) 1 B & Ad 950.
10 *Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council* [1925] AC 270.
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Bibliography
Cases
*Adams v Lindsell* (1818) 1 B & Ald 681
*Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co* [1893] 1 QB 256
*Collins v Godefroy* (1831) 1 B & Ad 950
*Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd* [1915] AC 847
*Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council* [1925] AC 270
*Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes* [1974] 1 WLR 155
*Partridge v Crittenden* [1968] 1 WLR 1204
*R v Clarke* (1927) 40 CLR 227
Books
McKendrick E, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (10th edn, OUP 2022)
