# The Democratic Deficit: Justifying the Vote for 16- and 17-Year-Olds
The line between protective exclusion and discriminatory disenfranchisement is a delicate one. More often than not, the circle of democratic participation expands not in a single leap, but through the challenging of long-held assumptions about who is fit to govern. This becomes particularly concerning when the fundamental right to vote is withheld from a group based on a seemingly pragmatic, yet ultimately arbitrary, criterion. The debate over lowering Canada’s federal voting age to 16 presents this very dilemma, forcing a balance between the state’s interest in a competent electorate and the democratic rights of its younger citizens. Although maintaining an age of majority for voting is presented as a measure to ensure electoral maturity, denying the franchise to 16- and 17-year-olds is an unjustifiable infringement of their *Charter* rights that should be remedied by lowering the voting age.
One major concern is the direct infringement of citizens’ fundamental democratic and equality rights. Section 3 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees that “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote”. The Supreme Court of Canada, in cases like *Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)* (2002), has affirmed that any limit on this core democratic right demands a high level of justification from the government. By setting the age at 18, the *Canada Elections Act* (2000) creates a clear restriction on the section 3 rights of citizens aged 16 and 17. Furthermore, this age-based distinction engages section 15 of the *Charter*, which protects against discrimination based on enumerated grounds, including age. The law draws a formal line that denies a benefit—the right to political participation—to individuals solely because they have not reached their eighteenth birthday. This differential treatment establishes a *prima facie* case of discrimination, placing the onus on the government to justify the infringement as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the *Charter*.
The justification for this infringement fails when scrutinised under the proportionality framework established in *R v Oakes* (1986). A measure limiting a *Charter* right must serve a pressing and substantial objective and be proportional to that objective. While the government’s objective of ensuring that the electorate is sufficiently mature and informed is undoubtedly legitimate, the choice of 18 as the universal cut-off fails the proportionality test, particularly at the minimal impairment stage. The law must impair the right as little as reasonably possible. However, the age of 18 does not align consistently with other legal thresholds for maturity and responsibility. In most provinces, 16-year-olds can drive, be employed and pay taxes, and make independent decisions about medical consent. It is inconsistent to deem them mature enough for these significant responsibilities while simultaneously deeming them too immature to cast a vote (Porteous, 2021). Less impairing alternatives are available; for instance, many countries like Austria, Scotland, and Brazil have successfully lowered their voting age to 16, demonstrating that a younger electorate is a viable and functioning model. By failing to consider these less intrusive options, the current law does not minimally impair the rights of young Canadians.
Supporters of the status quo may argue that setting a voting age is a necessary exercise in legislative line-drawing and that 18 is a reasonable and internationally common standard for adulthood. This argument deserves serious consideration because society must have a clear threshold for entry into the full spectrum of political rights. The Alberta Court of Appeal in *Fitzgerald v Alberta* (2004), in upholding the provincial voting age of 18, argued that such lines are necessary and that deference should be shown to the legislature’s choice. The court accepted the government’s objective of ensuring a mature electorate and found the age of 18 to be a reasonable proxy for that maturity. However, a legitimate objective does not automatically justify the means chosen to achieve it, especially when a fundamental right is at stake. The reasoning in *Fitzgerald* relies on a generalized assumption about the immaturity of those under 18, which is not supported by strong evidence and risks perpetuating stereotypes about young people. The Supreme Court’s robust defence of the franchise in *Sauvé* suggests that deference is less appropriate when dealing with the core democratic right to vote. Furthermore, the argument that younger voters lack political knowledge is a weak justification for exclusion; the same could be said for many adult voters, yet their right to vote is not questioned.
Ultimately, democratic inclusion and a competent electorate need not be opposing priorities. The denial of the vote to 16- and 17-year-olds rests on a weak and inconsistent foundation that fails to justify a clear infringement of sections 3 and 15 of the *Charter*. The law is not minimally impairing, and its discriminatory effect outweighs the speculative benefits of excluding a group of citizens who are already entrusted with significant societal responsibilities. Instead of exclusion, the government should consider lowering the voting age to 16 and pairing this reform with enhanced civics education in schools. This approach would allow Canada to address genuine concerns about political knowledge without treating disenfranchisement as the default solution. Such a change would not only resolve the constitutional infirmity of the current law but would also foster a culture of lifelong democratic engagement from an earlier age.
## References
- Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9.
- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
- Fitzgerald v Alberta, 2004 ABCA 184.
- Porteous, H. (2021) Lowering the Voting Age. Library of Parliament.
- R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
- Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 SCR 519.
