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Constitutional theory often distinguishes between two primary models for holding government power to account. Political constitutionalism suggests that the political process, primarily through Parliament, is the legitimate mechanism for limiting power. In contrast, legal constitutionalism places this responsibility on the law and an independent judiciary (Tomkins, 2003). While Australia’s system is often seen as a hybrid of these two models, this essay will argue that it does not strike a ‘right balance’. Instead, Australia’s constitutional arrangements display a significant asymmetry. Legal constitutionalism is applied with great force to protect the institutional structure of government, particularly the judiciary. However, the protection of individual and minority rights is largely left to the weaker mechanisms of political constitutionalism. This arrangement creates an imbalance, where the fundamental structure of the state is legally protected, but the rights of individuals within that state depend more on political will than on legal guarantees.
The Framers’ Preference for Political Constitutionalism
The origins of Australia’s constitutional character lie in the deliberate choices of its framers. They adopted the British model of responsible government, which places trust in Parliament as the central institution. This represented a conscious turn away from the model of the United States, with its constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights enforced by the judiciary. As Dawson J noted in *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992), the framers believed that providing constitutional guarantees of freedoms could be undemocratic, as it would limit the power of the elected Parliament to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth.
This preference for a political check on power had significant consequences for the protection of rights. During the constitutional conventions, a proposal for a clause similar to the US Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing due process and equal protection, was debated and ultimately rejected. Historical records suggest a key reason for this rejection was the concern that such a clause could invalidate racially discriminatory laws, particularly those affecting Indigenous Australians and immigrants (Williams and Hume, 2010). The result was a constitution largely silent on individual rights, with the limited exception of provisions like section 117, which prevents discrimination based on state residence. This foundational choice reveals that the system was not neutral on the question of rights; it deliberately entrusted them to the political process, the very forum where the rights of unpopular minorities are most vulnerable.
Legal Constitutionalism and the Structure of Government
In stark contrast to the weak constitutional protection for rights, Australia has developed a robust form of legal constitutionalism concerning the structure and powers of government. The High Court of Australia has firmly established its role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning. The principle of judicial review, which allows the Court to invalidate legislation that is unconstitutional, has been described as “axiomatic” (D’Emden, 2014). This was emphatically confirmed in *Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth* (2003), where the Court stated that its jurisdiction to determine the legality of government action could not be removed by Parliament.
This judicial assertiveness is most apparent in the enforcement of the separation of powers. The High Court has strictly interpreted Chapter III of the Constitution, which deals with judicial power. In *R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia* (1956), it was established that federal judicial power could only be exercised by the courts named in Chapter III, and that these courts could not exercise non-judicial powers. This principle was applied in *Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission* (1995) to strike down a scheme designed to make determinations of the Human Rights Commission directly enforceable. While the scheme aimed to provide an accessible and low-cost mechanism for addressing discrimination, the High Court found it invalid because it involved the exercise of judicial power by a non-judicial body. The outcome in *Brandy* suggests a judicial preference for maintaining the strict separation of judicial power, even where this may have practical disadvantages for citizens seeking remedies. This protective stance is also evident in the ‘persona designata’ cases, where the Court has placed limits on judges performing non-judicial functions in their personal capacity (*Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs* (1996)). These lines of authority demonstrate a powerful form of legal constitutionalism, but one that is primarily directed at preserving the institutional integrity and power of the judiciary itself.
Political Constitutionalism and the Protection of Rights
When the focus shifts from the structure of government to the rights of individuals, the constitutional model flips. Here, political constitutionalism remains the dominant approach. Australia is unusual among comparable democracies for its lack of a national bill of rights. As a result, many fundamental rights recognised in international law, such as those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not directly enforceable in Australian courts unless and until they are enacted into domestic legislation by Parliament (*Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh* (1995)).
Even where the High Court has identified rights-protective principles in the Constitution, they have been framed narrowly. The most significant example is the implied freedom of political communication. In cases like *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (1997), the High Court confirmed that the Constitution contains an implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters. However, the Court has consistently stressed that this is not a personal, individual right to free speech. Rather, it is a structural limitation on legislative power, implied as necessary for the functioning of the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. It serves to protect the political process, not the expressive interests of the individual as an end in itself.
Furthermore, attempts by state parliaments to introduce stronger rights protections have been interpreted in a way that preserves parliamentary supremacy. In *Momcilovic v The Queen* (2011), the High Court considered the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities. It held that the power given to courts under the Charter to issue a ‘declaration of inconsistent interpretation’ was not a judicial power. Such a declaration has no legal effect on the validity of the legislation in question; it merely notifies Parliament of the inconsistency, leaving the ultimate decision of whether to amend the law to the political process. This reinforces the idea that, in the Australian constitutional landscape, the final say on fundamental rights rests with politicians, not judges.
Conclusion
The assertion that Australia’s constitutional arrangements strike the ‘right balance’ between legal and political constitutionalism is difficult to sustain. The evidence points not to a balance, but to a clear division of labour. A robust, judicially enforced legal constitutionalism governs the architectural rules of the system, ensuring the separation of powers and protecting the role of the High Court. By contrast, a much weaker political constitutionalism governs the protection of individual rights, leaving them largely subject to the will of the parliamentary majority. This asymmetry means that the system is only stable and just to the extent that political actors choose to respect rights and norms that no court can enforce. The balance is therefore heavily skewed; while the institutions of government enjoy strong legal protection, the people within that system do not. This suggests that the balance is not ‘right’, but is instead a precarious arrangement that prioritises institutional form over substantive protection of the individual.
References
*Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106.
*Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission* (1995) 183 CLR 245.
D’Emden, C. (2014) ‘The ‘axiomatic’ principle of statutory interpretation: judicial review and the legislature’, *Australian Journal of Administrative Law*, 21(3), pp. 147–160.
*Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (1997) 189 CLR 520.
*Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh* (1995) 183 CLR 273.
*Momcilovic v The Queen* (2011) 245 CLR 1.
*Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth* (2003) 211 CLR 476.
*R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia* (1956) 94 CLR 254.
Tomkins, A. (2003) *Public Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, G. and Hume, D. (2010) *Human Rights under the Australian Constitution*. 2nd edn. Sydney: Federation Press.
*Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs* (1996) 189 CLR 1.
